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INTRODUCTION 
The Establishment Clause1 - and particularly the issue of gov­
ernment funding of religious education2 - is one of the murkiest areas 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government 
for a redress of grievances."). 
2. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
§ 12.2.6.2, at 1007 (1997) (noting that the Supreme Court's decisions on government aid to 
religious elementary and secondary schools are often "difficult to reconcile"). 
1108 
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of Supreme Court jurisprudence.3 The Supreme Court has acknowl­
edged as much,4 and the sharp divide in the Court's most recent forays 
into Establishment Clause territory illustrates the point that the cur­
rent jurisprudential standards allow for a broad range of interpreta­
tion. 5 There is some hope that the Supreme Court will provide further 
clarification of its Establishment Clause standard in the near future.6 
For now, however, it appears that the dominant mode of Establish­
ment Clause analysis is the examination of a government program's 
3. See, e.g., F. King Alexander & Klinton W. Alexander, The Reassertion of Church 
Doctrine in American Higher Education: The Legal and Fiscal Implications of the Ex Corde 
Ecclesiase for Catholic Colleges and Universities in the United States, 29 J.L. & EDUC. 149, 
157 (2000) (arguing that, rather than clarifying the "proper boundaries" between church and 
state, the Supreme Court "has managed to obscure it [sic), thus fueling the flames of contro­
versy surrounding the issue of separation"); Ronna Greff Schneider, Getting Help with Their 
Homework: Schools, Lower Courts, and the Supreme Court Justices Look for Answers Under 
the Establishment Clause, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 943, 995 (2001) (hypothesizing that a "consis­
tent and clear Establishment Clause jurisprudence" may not be possible for the current 
Court). 
4. See David H. McClamrock, Note, The First Amendment and Public Funding of Re­
ligiously Controlled or Af iliated Higher Education, 17 J.C. & U.L. 381, 383 (1991) (stating 
that "[t)he gloomy refrain, 'we can only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation' echoes 
through the procession of the Supreme Court cases concerning establishment-clause limits 
on aid to education" (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 603, 612 (1971))). 
5. There are at least three distinct tests for evaluating government aid to religious insti­
tutions. See Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 117 F. Supp. 2d 693, 704-06 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (noting 
and describing the current Establishment Clause tests). (1) The pervasively sectarian test, see 
Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); 
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); (2) the Agostini/modified Lemon test, see Mitchell 
v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 
U.S. 819 (1995); (3) the "endorsement" test, see County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties 
Union, 492 U.S. 573, 593 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring). 
6. In September 2001, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Simmons-Harris v. 
Zelman, in which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Ohio's school voucher pro­
gram violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Simmons-Harris v. 
Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 976 (2001). The Court consoli-· 
dated Zelman with Taylor v. Simmons-Harris, 533 U.S. 976 (2001), and Hanna Perkins 
School v. Simmons-Harris, 533 U.S. 976 (2001). 
It is unlikely that the Supreme Court's adjudication of the school voucher issue will set­
tle the conduit-financing issue. School vouchers involve an element of individual, private 
choice that differs significantly from that in conduit financing. Whereas school vouchers in­
volve a concrete form of intervening private choice in the decisions of each individual stu­
dent and his or her family, the private choices of bond purchasers in a revenue bond issuance 
are more restricted. See infra Il.B; see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 841 (2000) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring): 
The plurality bases its holding that actual diversion is permissible on Witters and Zobrest [ ci­
tation omitted). Those decisions, however, rested on a significant factual premise missing 
from this case, as well as from the majority of cases thus far considered by the Court involv­
ing Establishment Clause challenges to school-aid programs. Specifically, we decided Witters 
and Zobrest on the understanding that the aid was provided directly to the individual student 
who, in tum, made the choice of where to put that aid to use. (citation omitted}. 
If the Court determines that school voucher programs are constitutional, therefore, this rul­
ing would not necessarily mean that programs with more limited forms of private choice are 
constitutional as well. 
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purpose and effect, a test first articulated in 1970 in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman1 and modified over twenty years later in Agostini v. Felton.8 
Generally, in assessing the constitutionality of government aid to 
religious institutions, the Court looks to the aid's purpose and effect.9 
Any form of government aid must have a secular purpose and an ef­
fect that does not (1) result in indoctrination attributable to the gov­
ernment, (2) use religious criteria to identify potential recipients, or 
(3) lead to an excessive entanglement between church and state.10 In 
addition to this inquiry into a program's purpose and effect, the Court 
may consider whether the government aid has the purpose or effect of 
endorsing religion in the eyes of a reasonable observer.11 
As might be expected, lower courts have applied these guidelines 
to reach widely conflicting results. One particular controversy con­
cerns the eligibility of "pervasively sectarian"12 colleges to receive 
government loans funded by revenue bonds.13 Revenue bonds are of­
ten issued by specialized government agencies created and authorized 
by statute14 to issue municipal bonds in pursuit of a particular goal,15 
7. 403 U.S. 602 (1970). 
8. 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
9. The Court has emphasized that this analysis cannot be conducted mechanically. See, 
e.g. , Tilton, 403 U.S. at 677 (plurality opinion) (stating that any Establishment Clause inquiry 
"must begin with the candid acknowledgment that there is no single constitutional caliper 
that can be used to measure the precise degree to which these three factors are present or 
absent"). 
10. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 835 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
11. County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 599-600 (1989). 
12. As described in Section LB, infra, the Court has used the label of pervasive sectari­
anism to denote institutions in which sectarian and secular functions are so intertwined that 
the government cannot provide secular aid without simultaneously advancing the institu­
tion's religious agenda. See Tilton, 403 U.S. at 680 (plurality opinion). 
13. Generally, municipalities may issue bonds to finance improvements or projects that 
are beyond their current means. See generally 64 AM. JUR. 2D Public Securities and Obliga­
tions§ 11 (describing municipal bonds) [hereinafter Securities and Obligations]. The issuance 
of bonds must be authorized by state law. Id. § 50; see also id.§ 75. 
Revenue bonds may be distinguished from general obligation bonds in that, while gen­
eral obligation bonds pledge the full faith and credit of the issuing government branch, reve­
nue bonds are special obligations, secured only by the revenue generated by the sponsored 
project. Id. § 13 (describing general obligation and special obligation bonds). According to 
the U.S. Census Bureau, the majority of municipal issuances in the United States consists of 
revenue bonds. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
2001, at 275 tbl. 432 (121st ed. 2001) [hereinafter 2001 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT) . 
14. See, e.g., Educational Facilities Authority Act, CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 94100-94155 
(West 1989 & Supp. 2002) (upheld against an Establishment Clause challenge in California 
Educational Facilities Authority v. Priest, 526 P.2d 513 (1974)); Educational Facilities 
Authority Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-109-10 to -109-180 (Law Co-op 1990 & Supp. 2001) 
(upheld against an Establishment Clause challenge in Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973)); 
Educational Facilities Authority Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 23-30.39 to -30.58 (Law Co-op 
2000 & Supp. 2001) (upheld against an Establishment Clause challenge in Va. Coll. Bldg. 
Auth. v. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d 682 (Va. 2000)). 
15. See generally Public Securities and Obligations, supra note 13, § 50. 
March 2002] Revenue Bonds and Religious Education 1111 
such as the promotion of higher education.16 In such cases, the gov­
ernment agency (the "authority") serves as a conduit, issuing the 
bonds on behalf of a particular private entity and loaning the revenue 
from the issuance to the private entity to finance a specific project or 
improvement.17 The parties to this transaction typically appoint a third 
party as trustee to "monitor[] the institution's payments, credit­
worthiness, and compliance with terms of the loan,"18 thereby mini­
mizing the role of the issuing authority in the transaction.19 This fi­
nancing arrangement provides a distinct benefit to each party. Bond 
purchasers benefit because interest on certain municipal securities, in­
cluding revenue bonds, may be exempt from federal income taxation.20 
Bond purchasers accept lower rates of return on the bonds due to this 
tax exemption21 and, therefore, a private entity may finance an im­
provement more cheaply than if the entity had borrowed from a pri­
vate financial institution.22 By creating these incentives for both bond 
purchasers and private entities, revenue bonds advance the legisla­
tively mandated agenda of the issuing authority and therefore benefit 
the state or local government.23 
16. See 2001 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT,.supra note 13, at 275 tbl. 432 (comparing issu­
ances by, inter alia, state and local authorities, states, and municipalities); see also ROBERT 
S. AMDURSKY & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE LAW: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE § 3.4 (1992) [hereinafter MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE LAW] . 
17. See, e.g. , Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 1 17 F. Supp. 2d 693, 716-17 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) 
(describing the issuance of revenue bonds); see also PAUL R. DEMURO ET AL., HEALTH 
LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 29.33, (2001) (describing a standard conduit transaction between 
an issuer and a healthcare organization). 
18. Va. Coll. Bldg. Auth. v. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d 682, 687 (Va. 2000). This loan may be 
funded by a completed bond sale, see, e.g. , Johnson v. Econ. Dev. Corp., 241 F.3d 501, 505 
(6th Cir. 2001) (describing a revenue bond issuance in which proceeds from a completed 
bond sale were loaned to the private entity), or may consist of funds "borrowed" by an issu­
ing authority from the trustee, wherein the authority then transfers its interest in the loan to 
the trustee. See Steele, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 717. 
19. Steele, 1 17 F.Supp. 2d at 717. 
20. See I.RC. § 103 (1988) (providing that gross income does not include interest on 
state and local bonds, except as provided in § 103(b)). 
21. See Stuart Lark & Mary Groves, A Change of Focus at the Supreme Court May Lead 
to Wider Availability of Tax-Exempt Financing, 11 J. TAX'N EXEMPT OROS. 184, 184 (2000) 
(describing the issuance of tax-exempt revenue bonds). 
22. See, e.g., Press Release, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Vir­
ginia Supreme Court Hears Argument in Dispute over State aid for Pat Robertson's Regent 
University (June 2, 2000) (estimating that the issuance considered in Lynn saved Regent 
University "about $30 million in interest over the 30-year life of the loan"), at 
http://www.au.org/press/pr6200.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Regent Press 
Release]; see also Lark & Groves, supra note 21, at 184 (stating that, at times, "the lower 
interest rate is vital to making a project financially feasible"). 
23. For example, the bond issuance in Lynn was issued by the Virginia College Building 
Authority, an agency created to "carry out the purposes of the Educational Facilities 
Authority Act." See Lynn, 538 S.E.2d at 687 (citing Va. Code § 23-30.39 (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). The Virginia General Assembly passed this Act in order to "enable institu­
tions for higher education in the Commonwealth to provide the facilities and structures 
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Recent decisions from the Virginia Supreme Court and the District 
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee illustrate the constitutional 
dilemma that arises when pervasively sectarian institutions participate 
in this sort of financing arrangement. Taxpayers in these states have 
challenged revenue bond issuances that benefit religious colleges and 
universities as a violation of the Establishment Clause's prohibition 
against laws "respecting an establishment of religion."24 In Lynn, the 
Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether Regent University 
("Regent") was eligible to use proceeds generated from the Virginia 
College Building Authority's issuance of revenue bonds to finance 
construction projects on its campuses. After determining that Regent 
was a pervasively sectarian institution25 - in other words, that religion 
so infused Regent's curriculum that it was impossible for the govern­
ment to separate its secular and religious functions when distributing 
aid26 - the Virginia Supreme Court held that Regent could neverthe­
less participate in the revenue bond program without violating the Es­
tablishment Clause.27 The court reasoned that, given this conduit­
financing arrangement, any funds that Regent received were not gov­
ernment aid as such, that the program did not create an incentive for 
students to choose religious over secular education, and that Regent 
received government funds only as the result of bond purchasers' pri­
vate choices.28 
The District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee heard a 
case factually similar to Lynn but reached the opposite conclusion.29 In 
which are sorely needed [to educate youth], all to the public benefit and good." Id. (quoting 
Va. Code § 23-30.39 (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Lark & Groves, supra note 
21 at 184 (describing the social rationale behind the charitable tax exemption). 
24. U.S. CONST. ·amend. I. 
25. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d at 697-98. 
26. Id. at 697. Rather than relying on the Supreme Court's articulation of the perva­
sively sectarian standard, the Virginia Supreme Court looked to the literal meaning of the 
words: " 'Pervasive' describes that which 'pervades or tends to pervade.' MERRIAM­
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 868 (10th ed. 1999). 'Pervade' is defined as 'diffused 
throughout every part of.' 'Sectarian' means 'of, or relating to, or characteristic of a sect.' " 
Id. at 697 n.8 (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY at 868, 1056 (10th 
ed. 1999)). 
27. Id. at 699. 
28. See id. 
29. Prior to the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Johnson v. Economic Development Corp., 241 
F.3d 501 (6th Cir. 2001), one commentator had suggested that Johnson might resolve the 
Steele/Lynn split. See Stuart J. Lark, "Pervasively Sectarian" Institutions May Now Qualify 
for Tax-Exempt Financing, 12 J. TAX'N EXEMPT OROS. 173 (2001). Johnson failed to meet 
this expectation, however, because the Sixth Circuit stressed that the school at issue in that 
case was a merely sectarian rather than a pervasively sectarian institution. Johnson, 241 F.3d 
at 510. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit expressed the belief that Hunt's prohibition against gov­
ernment aid to pervasively sectarian institutions via revenue bonds remained good law. Id. 
For factors informing the Sixth Circuit's determination that the school was merely sectarian, 
see id. at 516-17. 
· 
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Steele v. Industrial Development Board,30 the district court considered 
the constitutionality of a bond issuance benefiting David Lipscomb 
University ("Lipscomb"), an institution much like Regent in its inte­
gration of "Christian faith and practice with the pursuit of academic 
excellence."31 As in Lynn, the district court found that Lipscomb was 
pervasively sectarian.32 Unlike the Virginia Supreme Court, however, 
the district court held that the revenue bonds were a direct benefit 
from the state and, consequently, that the bond issuance had the im­
permissible effect of advancing religion.33 
The only Supreme Court opinion to address this controversy di­
rectly appears, at first glance, to support the district court's conclusion 
in Steele. In Hunt v. McNair,34 the Supreme Court held that a revenue 
bond issuance benefiting a sectarian institution did not violate the Es­
tablishment Clause,35 but noted that conduit financing would have the 
effect of advancing religion when used to fund a loan for a pervasively 
sectarian institution.36 The underlying logic of Hunt, and the major 
constitutional concern of the pervasively sectarian standard, is that 
when a college is so sectarian in nature that its religious mission in­
fuses any otherwise secular activity, it is impossible for the govern­
ment to ensure that aid flows only to the institution's secular func­
tions.37 
While Hunt's standard is unambiguous, the case may no longer be 
good law. In the almost thirty years since Hunt, the Supreme Court's 
approach to Establishment Clause issues, as well as its understanding 
of when the government may provide aid to religious institutions, has 
undergone dramatic transformation.38 In order to address the 
Lynn/Steele split, then, it is necessary to reconsider the constitutional­
ity of conduit-financing arrangements that benefit private, pervasively 
sectarian colleges in light of the Court's recent jurisprudence. 
30. 117 F. Supp. 2d 693 (M.D. Tenn. 2000). 
31. Id. at 694. 
32. Id. at 710. 
33. Id. at 720. 
34. 413 U.S. 734 (1973). 
35. Id. at 736. 
36. Id. at 743: 
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion when it flows to 
an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are 
subsumed in the religious mission or when it funds a specifically religious activity in an oth­
erwise substantially secular setting. 
37. See, e.g., id. at 744 (noting that the issuance of revenue bonds would not support the 
school's religious functions because any projects funded through revenue bonds could not be 
used for religious purposes); id. at 749 (stating that the Act under which the bonds are is­
sued, as well as the Authority's rules and the College's proposal, all limit the government's 
aid to "the secular aspects of this liberal arts college"). 
38. See Section I.A. infra. 
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This Note argues that a government authority does not violate the 
Establishment Clause by issuing revenue bonds to finance a loan to a 
pervasively sectarian institution because such aid does not involve 
public funds, is neutrally available, and entails only a minimal and 
largely indirect relationship between the government and the perva­
sively sectarian institution.39 Part I argues that, although Hunt v. 
McNair once settled this issue, subsequent Supreme Court decisions 
have undermined two logical predicates of the pervasively sectarian 
test, thereby requiring courts to use pervasive sectarianism as a factor 
in the overall Establishment Clause determination rather than as a 
presumptive invalidation of government aid. Part II explains that 
revenue bond issuances benefiting pervasively sectarian institutions do 
not advance religion according to the Supreme Court's current stan­
dard. Finally, Part III examines the ultimate church-state relationship 
in conduit financing, and argues that because recipients of revenue 
bonds do not receive public funds as such and because the government 
has only a minimal role in the bond issue, any church-state relation­
ship arising from conduit financing arrangements does not rise to an 
unconstitutional level of entanglement. This Part also applies the en­
dorsement test to show that the only act of real constitutional signifi­
cance - the authority's approval of a revenue bond issuance that 
would benefit a pervasively sectarian institution - is not an endorse­
ment of religion. This Note concludes that the unique character of a 
revenue bond issuance allows pervasively sectarian institutions to par­
ticipate in this government activity without violating the Establish­
ment Clause. 
I. THE ONGOING EVOLUTION OF THE PERY AS IVEL Y SECT ARIAN 
TEST 
This Part contends that the constitutional validity of revenue bond 
issuances benefiting pervasively sectarian institutions is an open ques­
tion, despite a series of Supreme Court decisions that, at first glance, 
suggest the contrary. Section I.A outlines the basic constitutional prin­
ciples and the application of those principles through the pervasively 
sectarian standard in Tilton v. Richardson,40 Hunt v. McNair,41 and 
39. This argument assumes that any university benefiting from conduit financing re­
frains (or agrees to refrain) from engaging in discrimination that would raise a separate 
Fourteenth Amendment or human rights issue. See Dave Ahearn, Gay Rights Ruling May 
Break Impasse over Bond Issue for Georgetown U., BOND BUYER, Jan. 14, 1988, at 1 (re­
porting that Georgetown University's refusal to grant equal rights to gay student groups - a 
violation of a district human rights law - had impeded the approval of a revenue bond issu­
ance for the university's benefit). 
40. 403 U.S. 672 (1971). 
41. 413 U.S. 734 (1973). 
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Roemer v. Board of Public Works.42 This Section argues that the main 
impetus behind the pervasively sectarian standard is twofold: it de­
pends both on the presumption that an institution's religious functions 
are inseparable from its secular ones, and that actual diversion of gov­
ernment funds to religious indoctrination is always impermissible. Sec­
tion l.B contends that the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
since the "Tilton trilogy"43 has significantly undermined these predi­
cates for the pervasively sectarian standard by overruling the pre­
sumption that certain institutions will divert secular aid to religious 
purposes and by allowing the diversion of government aid in certain 
cases. Thus, according to the Supreme Court's current standard, the 
question is not whether the government may aid pervasively sectarian 
institutions but rather under what conditions the government may aid 
such institutions. 
A. Diversion as the Root of the Pervasively Sectarian Inquiry 
This Section explores the jurisprudential origins of the pervasively 
sectarian test, and argues that it is based on two prior assumptions: 
first, that the religious and secular functions of certain institutions are 
inseparable and, second, that actual diversion of government aid is 
impermissible in all circumstances. The pervasively sectarian test has 
its roots in the fundamental mandate of the First Amendment: that the 
government "shall make no law respecting an establishment of relig­
ion. "44 Justice Black, writing for the Supreme Court, elaborated upon 
this principle in an oft-quoted passage from Everson v. Board of Edu­
cation: the First Amendment means that a state cannot "pass laws 
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over an­
other. . . .  No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to sup­
port any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be 
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice relig­
ion. "45 Notwithstanding the absolutist language of Everson, the 
Supreme Court has never held that all financial aid to religious institu­
tions violates the Establishment Clause.46 Rather, the "crucial ques­
tion" posed by the Establishment Clause is whether the primary effect 
42. 426 U.S. 736 (1976). 
43. Marjorie Reiley Maguire, Comment, Having One's Cake and Eating It Too: Gov­
ernment Funding and Religious Exemptions for Religiously Affiliated Colleges and Universi­
ties, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1061, 1072 (using the "Tilton trilogy" label to describe Tilton, Hunt, 
and Roemer). 
44. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
45. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). 
46. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 679 (1971) (plurality opinion of Burger, 
C.J.) (citing Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), in which the Court upheld federal aid 
to a hospital run by a religious order). 
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of a legislative program advances religion.47 The Court has answered 
this question by determining whether the legislative program will "re­
sult in government indoctrination," "define its recipients by reference 
to religion," or "create an excessive entanglement [between church 
and state]. "48 
The Supreme Court developed the pervasively sectarian standard 
as a shortcut to the ultimate constitutional question of whether gov­
ernment aid advances religion. Tilton v. Richardson, which the Court 
decided on the same day in 1971 as Lemon v. Kurtzman,49 marked the 
first application of the pervasively sectarian standard to a government 
program aiding religious universities. In Tilton, the Court considered 
the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, which provided federal 
grants and loans to colleges for the construction of academic facili­
ties.so Taxpayers in Connecticut challenged the distribution of federal 
aid under this statute because of the participation of four "church­
related" colleges and universities.s1 A plurality of the Court found that 
the Act advanced a purely secular purpose,s2 noting with approval that 
the Act itself required recipients to use federal funds for secular ends, 
and that past recipients were obligated to return the aid upon a finding 
that it had been diverted to religious uses.s3 In so holding, the plurality 
rejected the taxpayers' contention that the nature of the recipient uni­
versities was such that it would be impossible for government aid to 
serve a purely secular purpose - that "religion so permeate[d] the 
secular education provided by church-related colleges and universities 
that their religious and secular educational functions [were] in fact in­
separable."s4 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the plurality, rejected 
the factual premise of this assertion by examining the recipient univer­
sities' actual use of the federally funded buildings,ss and by gauging the 
47. Id. at 679. 
48. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 845 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (describ­
ing this three-pronged inquiry). This current test modifies the Court's original test, first ar­
ticulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), and asks whether the statute in 
question has a secular purpose, whether its primary effect advances or inhibits religion, and 
whether the statute fosters an excessive entanglement between government and religion. 
49. 403 U.S 602 (1971). Both were decided on June 28, 1971. Id.; Tilton, 403 U.S. at 672. 
50. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 675. 
51. Id. at 676. 
52. Id. at 680 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.). 
53. Id. at 679-80 (plurality opinion). 
54. Id. at 680 (plurality opinion). 
55. Id. at 681 (plurality opinion): 
Two of the five federally financed buildings involved in this case are libraries. The District 
Court found that no classes had been conducted in either of these facilities and that no re­
strictions were imposed by the institutions on the books that they acquired. There is no evi­
dence to the contrary. The third building was a language laboratory at Albertus Magnus 
College. The evidence showed that this facility was used solely to assist students with their 
March 2002] Revenue Bonds and Religious Education 1117 
degree to which religion restricted academic freedom at the recipient­
universities.56 The plurality found that religion had not, in fact, 
"seep[ed] into the use of any of these facilities,"57 and that the schools 
allowed for a sufficient level of academic freedom.58 
Several aspects of the Tilton analysis are significant in light of the 
Supreme Court's later Establishment Clause jurisprudence. First, the 
Court looked to the actual use of the federally financed buildings and 
rejected the validity of considering instead a "composite profile" of a 
sectarian institution.59 Second, the Court's inquiry into the religious 
character of the school was aimed at determining whether the school 
was so religious that the government could not ensure that secular aid 
remained secular once distributed to recipients. Thus, the key issue in 
the Court's analysis - and the focus of what the Court would later 
formulate as the pervasively sectarian test - was the theoretical sepa­
rability of religious and secular educational functions.60 Third, it is sig­
nificant that Tilton dismissed one of the arguments often made by op­
ponents of government aid to religious institutions: that aiding the 
secular functions of a religious college would indirectly advance its re­
ligious functions by freeing resources for use in religious education. 
Tilton states that, where the government can directly aid a school's 
secular functions without simultaneously giving direct aid to its relig­
ious functions, it is of no consequence that this aid may provide inci­
dental benefit to the institution's religious functions.61 This conclusion 
follows logically from the principle that the Lemon/Agostini test looks 
only to the primary effect of government aid.62 
While Tilton hinted at the relevance of pervasive sectarianism, 
Hunt v. McNair63 cemented the principle that the pervasively sectarian 
test may serve as a shortcut for the Lemon inquiry. In Hunt, the Court 
applied the pervasively sectarian test in order to determine whether 
pronunciation in modern foreign languages - a use which would seem peculiarly unrelated 
and unadaptable to religious indoctrination. Federal grants were also used to build a science 
building at Fairfield University and a music, drama, and arts building at Annhurst College. 
56. Id. at 680-82 (plurality opinion). 
57. Id. at 681 (plurality opinion). While the Supreme Court did not find that the partici­
pation of the "church-related colleges" violated the Establishment Clause, it did hold that 
the Act violated the First Amendment by limiting the government's interest - and thus the 
requirement that the federally financed facilities be used only for secular purposes - to a 
twenty-year period. Id. at 683. 
58. Id. at 681 (plurality opinion). 
59. See id. at 682 (plurality opinion). 
60. Id. at 680 (plurality opinion). 
61. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973) (citing Tilton for the proposition that 
"the Court has not accepted the recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden because aid to 
one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends"). 
62. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 679 (plurality opinion). 
63. Hunt, 413 U.S. 734 (1973). 
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government aid - in this case, a loan financed by a revenue bond is­
suance - was likely to be diverted to the institution's religious func­
tions.64 Because the revenue bond issuance considered in Hunt was not 
yet complete at the time of litigation, the Court was unable to examine 
the college's actual use of the loan and had to consider only whether 
the recipient college was "oriented significantly towards sectarian 
rather than secular education."65 Justice Powell, writing for a majority 
of the Court, initially used Ti/ton's pervasively sectarian analysis as a 
prima facie test for the advancement prong of the Lemon analysis: 
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing re­
ligion when it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that 
a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mis­
sion or when it funds a s£ecifically religious activity in an otherwise sub­
stantially secular setting. 6 
The Court concluded that neither the character of the recipient, the 
Baptist College at Charleston, nor Baptist College's likely use of the 
aid raised any constitutional concerns.67 
Hunt expanded on Tilton by applying the pervasively sectarian 
analysis to the entanglement prong of the Lemon test as well as to the 
advancement prong. The entanglement analysis, at least in its "ad­
ministrative entanglement" mode,68 begins with the same fundamental 
concern as the advancement analysis: the government may aid relig­
ious institutions only if those institutions refrain from using secular aid 
to indoctrinate students. The Court considered the degree to which 
the recipient college was sectarian in order to determine whether such 
diversion was likely.69 In the Court's view, "the degree of entangle­
ment . . . varies in large measure with the extent to which religion 
permeates the institution."70 As the Court had already stated in 
Lemon, certain religious schools cannot participate in government 
programs without an oversight mechanism to ensure that government 
aid is not diverted to religious indoctrination.71 This degree of surveil­
lance may lead to an unconstitutional degree of government-church 
entanglement.72 The Court found in Hunt, however, that no such wide-
64. Id. at 736. 
65. Id. at 744. 
66. Id. at 743. 
67. Id. at 744. 
68. For a description of the two modes of entanglement analysis in Lemon, see 
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1588 (3d ed. 1996). 
69. Hunt, 413 U.S. at 746 & n.8. 
70. Id. at 746. 
71. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971). 
72. See id. ("The substantial religious character of these church-related schools gives rise 
to entangling church-state relationships of the kind the Religion Clauses sought to avoid."). 
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spread supervision was necessary to ensure that aid to Baptist College 
remained secular in effect. 73 
Given Hunt's holding that the Establishment Clause did not bar a 
merely sectarian university from benefiting from the issuance of reve­
nue bonds,74 its real significance for the present analysis is the implica­
tion that the Establishment Clause does prohibit a pervasively sectar­
ian university from benefiting from revenue bonds.75 The Supreme 
Court recognized the full import of Hunt three years later in Roemer 
v. Board of Public Works.76 A plurality of the Court held in Roem�r 
that a Maryland program providing an annual subsidy to colleges and 
universities - including four Roman Catholic colleges - did not vio­
late the First Amendment.77 Central to the Court's holding was the de­
termination that the institutions at issue were not pervasively sectar­
ian.78 With regard to the advancement prong of the Lemon test, the 
Blackmun plurality stated that any aid "flowing directly to such 're­
ligion pervasive institutions' [such as those considered in Lemon and 
Meek v. Pittenger79] had the primary effect of advancing religion."80 As 
for the entanglement prong, the Roemer plurality found that "Hunt 
requires {l) that no state aid at all go to institutions that are so 'perva­
sively sectarian' that secular activities cannot be separated from sec­
tarian ones, and (2) that if secular activities can be separated out, they 
alone may be funded. "81 
The significance of this precedent in a given case, of course, de­
pends on whether the Court is likely to find that a particular institu­
tion is pervasively sectarian. Throughout the Tilton trilogy, the Court 
looked to a consistent set of factors in making this determination. The 
degree of academic freedom that prevails on the college or university's 
campus is central to the Court's analysis.82 In both Tilton and Roemer, 
73. Hunt, 413 U.S. at 746. 
74. Id. at 749. 
75. See, e.g. , Alexander & Alexander, supra note 3 at 164 (noting that Hunt "allowed for 
the possibility that an Establishment Gause violation may exist where public money is dis­
tributed to support institutions that are 'pervasively sectarian' "). 
76. 426 U.S. 736 (1976). 
77. Id. at 767 (plurality opinion). 
78. Id. at 762 (plurality opinion) (finding that the colleges provided "distinct and sepa-
rable" secular educational functions). 
79. 421 U.S. 349 (1975). 
80. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 753 (quoting Meek, 421 U.S. at 366). 
81. Id. at 755 (plurality opinion) (italics in original). 
82. See id. at 756 (plurality opinion); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 747 n.8 (1973); 
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 681-82 (1971); see also Hunt, 413 U.S. at 747 (noting that 
the college in question did not place particular emphasis on sectarian education); Maguire, 
supra note 43 (arguing, inter alia, that academic freedom, itself a constitutional right, has 
played a vital role in the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause analysis). 
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the Court noted that the recipient institutions "subscribe[d) to, and 
abide[d) by, the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom 
of the American Association of University Professors."83 The Court 
also examined the institutions' selection of faculty and students, look­
ing favorably upon colleges and universities that hired faculty and ad­
mitted students without regard to religious affiliation.84 In addition, 
the Court considered whether religious activities such as chapel atten­
dance and prayer were mandatory, suggesting that a lack of compul­
sory religious exercises indicates that a school is merely sectarian 
rather than pervasively sectarian.85 Finally, the Court inquired into the 
recipient-university's "institutional autonomy," or the degree to which 
religious authority dominates the university's administration.86 Even in 
the Tilton trilogy, mere affiliation with a religious order was not 
enough to justify a finding of pervasive sectarianism. Indeed, in Tilton 
and Hunt, the Court noted that a religious authority governed the in­
stitutions in question but, due to the other factors in the analysis, this 
governance did not rise to the level of pervasive sectarianism.87 Relig­
ious governance appears to raise constitutional concerns only when it 
limits the field of academic inquiry, results in religious qualifications 
for admission to the academic community, or turns secular education 
into a vehicle for religious proselytization.88 
According to the Supreme Court's analysis in Roemer, Hunt, and 
Tilton, the presence of these factors indicates that the institution in 
question is so religious in orientation that its religious and secular 
83. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 756 (plurality opinion); Tilton, 403 U.S. at 681-82 (plurality 
opinion) (finding that, although the four colleges in question had "certain religious restric­
tions on what could be taught," these policies were not enforced but were instead super­
seded by an "atmosphere of academic freedom"); see also Stephen V. Monsma, The "Perva­
sively Sectarian" Standard in Theory and Practice, 13 N.D. J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 321 
(1999); 15A AM. JUR. 2D Colleges & Universities§ 39, at 310-11 (2000) (listing four factors 
relevant to the determination of whether a college or university is pervasively sectarian). 
84. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 757-58 (plurality opinion); Hunt, 413 U.S. at 742, 743-44, 746; 
Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686 (plurality opinion). 
85. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 755-56 (plurality opinion) (noting nonmandatory chapel and 
prayers in a "  'minuscule' percentage" of classes); Tilton, 403 U.S. at 682 (plurality opinion) 
(observing that mandatory attendance at chapel was an element of the appellants' "compos­
ite" institution but was not a requirement at the actual colleges and universities under con-
sideration). 
· 
86. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 755 (plurality opinion) (quoting Roemer v. Bd. Of Pub.Works, 
387 F. Supp. 1282, 1287 n.7 (D. Md. 1974) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hunt, 413 
U.S. at 747-48, Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686 (plurality opinion). 
87. Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743 (noting, inter alia, that members of the college's board of trus­
tees were elected by the South Carolina Baptist Convention); Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686 (plural­
ity opinion) (stating that each college in question was "governed by Catholic religious or­
ganizations"). 
88. See, e.g. , Roemer, 426 U.S. at 755-56 (plurality opinion); Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686-87 
(plurality opinion). This principle is evident in the very definition of pervasive sectarianism, 
as it includes those universities where "a substantial portion of their functions are subsumed 
in the religious mission." Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743 (emphasis added). 
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functions are inseparable, pushing the college or university outside the 
realm of secular academics. As the Court recognized in its later Es­
tablishment Clause cases, underlying this concept of pervasive sectari­
anism is the presumption that such institutions will use secular aid, in­
tentionally or unintentionally, to support their sectarian activities.89 
The preceding analysis suggests that this presumption is based on the 
more fundamental notion that such diversion is always impermissible 
under the Establishment Clause. Tilton, Roemer, and Hunt, therefore, 
appear to offer a quick resolution to the present inquiry. If those deci­
sions reflect the current Court's Establishment Clause standard, per­
vasively sectarian institutions are prohibited from participating in 
revenue bond issuances. 
B.  Mitchell v .  Helms: The Need to Revisit Hunt v .  McNair 
There is a growing sense among observers of the Court's Estab­
lishment Clause jurisprudence that the Tilton trilogy's pervasively sec­
tarian analysis may be obsolete.90 Numerous commentators have noted 
that the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause standard has evolved 
a great deal over the last decade and that the Court may reshape the 
nature of Establishment Clause inquiry in the near future.91 These 
commentators find ample support for their position in Mitchell v. 
Helms,92 decided in June, 2000. In Mitchell, the Court approved of a 
federal program that loaned funds to local education agencies, which 
then provided educational materials such as audiovisual equipment to 
primary and secondary schools - including private, religious schools.93 
A plurality of the Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, emphasized 
the neutral, secular criteria by which the government distributed aid94 
89. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 844-49 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see 
also Lark, supra note 29, at 179 (arguing that, in rejecting the presumption of divertibility in 
Agostini, Justice O'Connor eliminated the logical predicate of the pervasively sectarian doc­
trine). 
90. See, e.g., Lark, supra note 29, at 179 (noting that the plurality in Mitchell 
expressly rejected the pervasively sectarian test and arguing that Agostini had already 
rejected the test's underlying presumption); Edsell M. Eady Jr. & James D. Nguyen, 
Using "Benign Neutrality" to Bring Low-Cost Municipal Bond Financing to 
Church-Sponsored K-12 Schools, CHURCH Bus. (Apr. 2000), available at 
http://www.churchbusiness.com/articles/0411egal.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2002) (promoting 
a "benign neutrality" analysis in place of the pervasively sectarian test). 
91. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 3; Ola Kinnander, NABL Lawyers Optimistic About 
Future of Bonds for Religious Schools, BOND BUYER, Feb. 20, 2001, at 5. 
92. 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (holding that private Catholic schools could participate in a fed­
eral program providing secular educational materials to elementary and secondary schools); 
see also Freedman, supra note 3, at 329-30 (describing the procedural history of Mitchell). 
93. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 802-03 (plurality opinion). 
94. See, e.g. , id. at 810 (plurality opinion). 
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and the role of "numerous private choices" in allocating this aid,95 ul­
timately holding that these two factors indicated the aid was neutral 
toward religion in the sense mandated by the First Amendment.96 
More significantly, the plurality claimed that it was time for the 
Court to overrule certain presumptions that, although once well es­
tablished in the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, had sub­
sequently eroded. The Mitchell plurality contended, first, that the rule 
against diversion97 of government aid "is inconsistent with [the 
Court's] more recent case law and is unworkable."98 When govern­
ment aid is secular in content and neutrally available,· the plurality 
viewed it as irrelevant to the constitutional analysis that recipients 
might divert that aid to religious education.99 Noting that the Court 
had already expressed a lack of concern for divertibility in Witters v. 
Washington Department of Services for the Blind100 and Zobrest v. 
Catalina Foothills School District, 101 the plurality argued that, in any 
case, divertibility has no real connection to the core constitutional is­
sue: 
A concern for divertibility, as opposed to improper content, is misplaced 
not only because it fails to explain why the sort of aid that we have al­
lowed is permissible, but also because it is boundless - enveloping all 
aid, no matter how trivial - and thus has only the most attenuated (if 
any) link to any realistic concern for preventing an "establishment of re­
ligion. "102 
The preceding analysis of the Tilton trilogy suggests that, in re­
j ecting any concern for divertibility, the Mitchell plurality thereby did 
away with any possible rationale for applying the pervasively sectarian 
test.103 The plurality indeed concluded that this test is outmoded,104 but 
gave four different reasons for its obsolescence. First, the plurality 
95. See, e.g. , id. (plurality opinion) ("As a way of assuring neutrality, we have repeatedly 
considered whether any governmental aid that goes to a religious institution does so 'only as 
a result of the genuinely independent and private choices of individuals.' " (internal citations 
omitted)). 
96. Id. at 829 (plurality opinion). 
97. Diversion may be defined in this context as "the use of governmental aid to further a 
religious message." Id. at 821 (plurality opinion). 
98. Id. at 820 (plurality opinion). 
99. Id. (plurality opinion). 
100. 474 U.S. 481 (1986). 
101. 509 U.S. 1 (1993). 
102. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 824 (plurality opinion). 
103. See supra Part I.A. 
104. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 826 ("[T)here was a period when [pervasive sectarianism) mat­
tered, particularly if the pervasively sectarian school was a primary or secondary school. But 
that period is one that the Court should regret, and it is thankfully long past." (citation omit­
ted)). Freedman states that this claim "abandoned years of established precedent." Freed­
man, supra note 3, at 334. 
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noted its relevance was "in sharp decline,"105 as the Court had not re­
lied on divertibility as a factor in rejecting an aid program since 
1985.106 Second, the plurality argued that an aid recipient's religious 
proclivities are irrelevant to the constitutional analysis.107 That is, 
when the government advances its secular agenda with a program al­
locating aid on a neutral basis, "it is a mystery which view of religion 
the government has established, and thus a mystery what the constitu­
tional violation would be."108 Third, the plurality contended that the 
pervasively sectarian label is "offensive," as is judicial examination of 
an aid recipient's religious beliefs.109 In a final, related objection, the 
plurality argued that this categorization has a "shameful pedigree" of 
hostility toward Catholicism, concluding that a doctrine "born of big­
otry" no longer has a place in the Court's Establishment Clause j uris­
prudence.110 
The plurality's proposed mode of Establishment Clause analysis 
would mark a significant transition - or, for some commentators, a 
"[s]eismic disturbance"m - in the Court's approach to government 
aid to religious schools. Indeed, a majority of the Justices expressed 
opposition to the plurality's view of the Establishment Clause. Justice 
O'Connor's concurrence, written in response to the "unprecedented 
breadth" of the plurality's Establishment Clause standard,112 argued 
that actual diversion of government aid to religious indoctrination is 
inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.113 She maintained that 
Witters and Zobrest, two cases relied upon by the plurality, permit di­
version of government aid only because of the overriding role of indi­
vidual choice in allocating that aid.1 14 For Justice O'Connor, diversion 
105. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 826 (plurality opinion). 
106. Id. (plurality opinion). 
107. Id. at 827-28 (plurality opinion). 
108. Id. at 827 (plurality opinion). 
109. Id. at 828 (plurality opinion). 
1 10. Id. at 828-29 (plurality opinion). 
1 1 1 .  Jason S. Marks, Only a "Speed Bump" Separating Church and State?, 57 J. Mo. B. 
36, 43 (2001); see also Charles J.  Russo & David L. Gregory, The Constitutional Vitality of 
Ex Corde Ecclesiae and A [sic} Response to the Alexander's Despair, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 307, 
314-15(2001) (claiming that Mitchell "effectively dismantled" the metaphorical "wall of 
separation" between church and state). 
1 12. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 837 (O'Connor, J. concurring). 
1 13. Id. at 840. Justice O'Connor cites Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988), as sup­
porting this prohibition against diversion. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 840 (O'Connor, J., concur­
ring). She notes that, while the Bowen Court determined that the statute in question was 
constitutional "on its face," id. at 841, the Court remanded the case for the district court to 
determine whether there was evidence of any actual diversion. This concern for actual diver­
sion rather than potential or likely diversion is central to Justice O'Connor's Establishment 
Clause analysis. 
1 14. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 841 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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violates the Establishment Clause when the government provides a 
"direct subsidy," but may be permissible when the aid is "more akin to 
the government issuing a paycheck to an employee who, in tum, do­
nates a portion of that check to a religious institution. "115 
Unlike Justice Souter, who argued in dissent that the assumptions 
underlying the pervasively sectarian standard have continuing rele­
vance, 1 16 Justice O'Connor rejected the presumption that certain re­
ligious schools will use government aid for religious purposes. She 
cited Agostini for the proposition that "it would be inappropriate to 
presume inculcation of religion; rather, plaintiffs raising an Establish­
ment Clause challenge must present evidence that the government aid 
in question has resulted in religious indoctrination." 1 17 While Justice 
O'Connor did not thereby overrule the root of the pervasively sectar­
ian test - the belief that diversion is impermissible under all circum­
stances - her concurrence did reject one of the predicates for the test: 
the presumption that certain religiously affiliated institutions are in­
herently prone to diverting secular government aid to religious indoc­
trination.118 
Mitchell points to several factors in the Court's recent Establish­
ment Clause jurisprudence suggesting that an institution's pervasive 
sectarianism is only one factor for the Court to weigh in determining 
the constitutionality of government aid. Specifically, four trends in the 
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence indicate the Tilton tril­
ogy's approach to aid benefiting pervasively sectarian colleges and 
universities warrants a fresh look. 
First, as suggested by both the plurality and the concurring Justices 
in Mitchell, the Supreme Court has held that, in certain circumstances, 
actual diversion of government aid does not violate the Establishment 
Clause.119 Although Justices O'Connor and Breyer disagree with the 
1 15. Id. 
116. Justice Souter applies the pervasively sectarian standard, arguing that, where a 
school is unable to separate its religious teaching from secular education, "direct govern­
ment subsidies to such schools are prohibited because they will inevitably and impermissibly 
support religious indoctrination." Id. at 837 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
117. Id. at 858 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
1 18. See Lark, supra note 29. Lark argues that, although Justice O'Connor did not reject 
the pervasively sectarian inquiry 'entirely, "[s]he did, however, reject the presumption on 
which the analysis depends" - namely, that secular aid will be diverted to religious uses at 
particular schools. Id. at 9. He notes later, however, that Justice O'Connor may invalidate a 
program if she found evidence of diversion: Id. This prediction is in line with the analysis in 
Section I.A, which contends that the pervasively sectarian test depends not only on the pre­
sumption that diversion is inevitable but also on the principle that such diversion is always 
impermissible. Because Justice O'Connor does not reject this latter principle as well, her 
Mitchell concurrence does not completely undermine the pervasively sectarian test. A ma­
jority of the Court, therefore, currently supports some sort of pervasive sectarianism inquiry. 
119. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 820 (plurality opinion); id. at 855-56 (O'Connor, J., joined 
by Breyer, J., concurring). 
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Mitchell plurality as to the overall significance of Witters and Zobrest 
for the governing Establishment Clause test, both sides agree that 
Witters and Zobrest are, in fact, examples of permissible diversion of 
government aid.120 For Mitchell's plurality, a religious institution's sec­
tarian use of ostensibly secular aid is permissible when diverted aid is 
itself devoid of religious content and the government has allocated aid 
without regard for recipients' religious affiliation.121 The concurring 
Justices take a somewhat harder line, arguing that the Court approved 
the diversion of government aid in Witters and Zobrest only because 
" [a ]ny aid . . . that ultimately flows to religious institutions does so 
only as a result of the genuinely independent and private choices of 
aid recipients."122 Despite this difference, the plurality and the concur­
ring Justices both reject the rule "that all government aid that directly 
assists the educational function of religious schools is invalid."123 
In dismissing this rule, even if this rejection was subject to a num­
ber of qualifications, the Court undermined one of the fundamental 
predicates of the pervasively sectarian test. As described in Section 
I.A, the Court's reluctance to aid pervasively sectarian institutions is 
rooted in the principle that government aid must not, under any cir­
cumstances, fund religious activities.124 It is this logic that supports the 
rule in Hunt "that no state aid at all go to institutions that are so 'per­
vasively sectarian' that secular activities cannot be separated from sec­
tarian ones, and . . .  that if secular activities can be separated out, they 
alone may be funded."125 The Court's finding that diversion does not 
violate the Establishment Clause in certain circumstances means, at 
least, that a court faced with a revenue bond issuance benefiting a per­
vasively sectarian institution must determine anew the extent to which 
that transaction satisfies the requirements of neutrality and private 
choice. 
Second, the Court's recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
highlights the fact that there may be variations in the distribution of 
government aid that mitigate constitutional concerns. This attention to 
the particular form of aid is nothing new in the Court's Establishment 
120. Mitchell's plurality makes this point as well. Id. at 820-21.  
121. Id. at 820 ("So long as the governmental aid is not itself 'unsuitable for use in the 
public schools because of religious content' and eligibility for aid is determined in a constitu­
tionally permissible manner, any use of that aid to indoctrinate cannot be attributed to the 
government and is thus not of constitutional concern." (internal citation omitted)). 
122. Id. (O'Connor, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dep't 
of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted) (altera­
tion in original)). 
123. Id. at 842 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 225 
(1997) (internal citation marks omitted)). 
124. See supra Section I.A. 
125.  Roemer v. Bd. Of Pub. Works, 426 U.S.736, 755 (1976) (plurality opinion) (de­
scribing Hunt's requirements). 
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Clause analysis. It was, after all, a determinative factor in the Court's 
holding in Everson v. Board of Education that a New Jersey program 
allowing a board of education to reimburse parents for their children's 
bus transportation to religious schools did not violate the Establish­
ment Clause.126 Possible variations in distribution of government aid 
have taken on increasing significance, however, as the Court's opin­
ions in Zobrest and Witters stressed the importance of indirect distri­
bution in rendering an otherwise impermissible diversion of govern­
ment aid valid under the Establishment Clause.127 The Court 
articulated the indirect/direct distinction in Witters as that between a 
transfer similar to a "hypothetical salary donation," in which a gov­
ernment employee donates a portion of her paycheck to a religious in­
stitution, and "an impermissible 'direct subsidy,' " in which the gov­
ernment provides financial assistance directly to that religious 
institution.128 The former transaction, even when it results in indirect 
financial assistance to an institution's religious mission, passes consti­
tutional muster because a private individual, rather than the govern­
ment, has distributed government aid to that religious institution.129 
Although Justices have described the relevance of the form of distri­
bution in different ways,130 the Court has consistently found that the 
manner in which government aid reaches the beneficiary may take on 
an important role in the constitutional analysis. 
While the Court considered a revenue bond issuance in Hunt v. 
McNair, the Court did not rely on the indirectness of a loan funded by 
revenue bonds in that case to determine that the aid in question was 
consistent with the Establishment Clause. In a lengthy footnote, how­
ever, the Court noted that government aid through revenue bonds was 
fundamentally unlike a direct subsidy.131 The "only state aid," accord­
ing to the Court, is the initial "creation of an instrumentality" author­
ized to issue revenue bonds.132 Given the importance of the indirect 
126. 330 U.S. 1 3, 18 (1947) (noting that the aid in question is received by parents rather 
than parochial schools); see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 621(1971) (distinguishing 
Everson and Allen). 
127. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993); Witters, 474 U.S. 
at 488. 
128. Witters, 474 U.S. at 487. 
129. See id. 
130. Justice Souter, dissenting in Mitchell, framed this distinction in terms of a di­
rect/indirect inquiry, which allows the Court to observe "distinctions between government 
schemes with individual beneficiaries and those whose beneficiaries in the first instance 
might be religious schools." Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 888 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
Mitchell's plurality, on the other hand, prefers to view the direct/indirect distinction in terms 
of private choice. Id. at 816 (plurality opinion). 
131. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 745 n.7 (1973). 
132. Id. The Hunt footnote is quoted in full in Section III.A. See infra text accompany­
ing note 236. 
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character of government aid in Zobrest and Witters, the "special"133 na­
ture of loans funded by an issuance of revenue bonds may warrant re­
newed consideration. 
Third, the Court has undermined two presumptions that had pre­
viously shaped Establishment Clause j urisprudence and the perva­
sively sectarian standard in particular. The Court expressly recognized 
the demise of these presumptions in Agostini v. Felton.134 First, the 
Court discarded the assumption that the placement of government 
employees in parochial schools "inevitably results in the impermissible 
effect of state-sponsored indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic un­
ion between government and religion."135 At first glance, this state­
ment would seem to have little impact on the present analysis because 
the use of public employees by students at parochial schools is a dif­
ferent form of aid than a loan financed by tax-exempt revenue bonds. 
A closer look at the Court's statement in Agostini suggests, however, 
that the Court is calling into question the validity of such presump­
tions in general. While the question posed in Agostini and Zobrest had 
to do with an individual's compliance with the terms of her employ­
ment, this question is related to the issue of whether an institution will 
abide by the terms of its loan. There is no clear reason why Agostini's 
evidentiary requirement should not extend to the latter as well as the 
former. In this sense, the Court's elimination of the "symbolic union" 
presumption has important repercussions, as the Court is now less 
willing to assume that diversion of secular aid funded by a revenue 
bond issuance will take place at a pervasively sectarian institution, and 
will instead require evidence to that effect.136 
In addition, the Court rejected the rule "that all government aid 
that directly assists the educational function of religious schools is in­
valid. "137 This conclusion stemmed from two prior determinations. The 
Court decided that allowing a student to use neutrally available gov­
ernment aid, such as Zobrest's sign-language interpreter, at a religious 
school was "no different" from allowing a state employee to give a 
portion of her paycheck to a religious institution, given the intervening 
133. Id. 
134. 521 U.S. 203, 223-30 (1997). 
135. Id. at 223. 
136. In Justice O'Connor's words, "In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we as­
sumed instead that the interpreter (in Zobrest] would dutifully discharge her responsibilities 
as a full-time public employee and comply with the ethical guidelines of her profession by 
accurately translating what was said." Id. at 224 (citing Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. 
Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 12 (1997)). 
137. Id. at 225. Although this section of Agostini may be read as "mark(ing] the death of 
the direct/indirect distinction," see Freedman, supra note 3, 91 at 333, this "death" amounts 
only to the demise of the presumptive validity of indirect aid and the presumptive invalidity 
of indirect aid. The method of aid - indeed, its "directness" - still factors in the Court's 
Establishment Clause analysis. Id. 
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role of private choice in either case.138 The Court also determined that 
the presence of a government employee such as Zobrest's sign­
language interpreter on the grounds of a religious school supported 
neither the presumption. that the interpreter would indoctrinate the 
student by manipulating her role as an interpreter, nor the finding of a 
symbolic union between church and state. 1 39 In effect, the Court con­
cluded that the First Amendment did not prevent a private individual 
from using secular, neutrally available government aid in the manner 
of her choice and that the Court could not presume, without evidence 
to the contrary, that a religious institution would take advantage of 
that individual's private choice to indoctrinate her. Although the pro­
vision of government aid therefore had the effect of facilitating relig­
ious education in some cases, it did so without violating the Estab­
lishment Clause. 
Finally, the increasing importance of neutrality in the Supreme 
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence suggests that the constitu­
tionality of revenue bond issuances benefiting pervasively sectarian 
institutions warrants a fresh look. In Justice O'Connor's words, the 
Court has "taken a more forgiving view of neutral government pro­
grams that make aid available generally without regard to the religious 
or nonreligious character of the recipient school. "140 Behind this "more 
forgiving view" is the rationale that, when the government makes a 
particular form of aid available to anyone regardless of his or her re­
ligious affiliation, the government does not have a meaningful role in 
any indoctrination that may take place as the result of the recipient's 
use of that aid.141 This factor, along with the aid recipient's intervening 
choice, contributed to a finding of constitutionality in Witters,142 
Zobrest,143 and Agostini,144 and was trumpeted by the Mitchell plurality 
as central to the determination that a given form of government aid 
138. Agostini, 512 U.S. at 226. 
139. Id. at 226-27. 
140. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 847 (2000) (O'Connor, J. concurring); see also id. 
at 809 (plurality opinion) ("In distinguishing between indoctrination that is attributable to 
the State and indoctrination that is not, we have consistently turned to the principle of neu­
trality, upholding aid that is offered to a broad range of groups or persons without regard to 
their religion."). 
141. Id. (plurality opinion). 
142. Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487-88 (1986) (finding 
that the program in question was generally available without regard to the sectarian or non­
sectarian character of the institution benefited). 
143. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1997) (stating that Witters' 
logic with regard to the program's neutrality could be applied in Zobrest "with equal force"). 
144. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231-32 (noting that, like the aid approved in Zobrest, Title I 
remedial instructors are available to students "at whatever school they choose to attend"). 
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does not violate the Establishment Clause.145 In contrast, the neutral 
availability of revenue bonds played no role in Hunt v. McNair.146 
These four developments in the Supreme Court's Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence mean that the pervasively sectarian analysis may 
be out of step with the Court's current understanding of the Estab­
lishment Clause. That is not to say, however, that the concept of per­
vasive sectarianism is no longer significant in Establishment Clause 
analysis or that the degree of religiosity at an institution benefiting 
from a government program is irrelevant. Rather, the Court's renun­
ciation of the principles upon which the pervasively sectarian standard 
is based means that pervasive sectarianism can no longer be applied as 
a presumptive disqualification of certain institutions from participa­
tion in government programs. Certain schools may raise special Es­
tablishment Clause concerns because, although courts must presume 
that these schools will abide by the contractual terms of government 
aid,147 the court may find nevertheless that a religious agenda infuses 
every classroom and every ostensibly secular subject.148 In such cases, a 
more nuanced inquiry is called for - one that reflects the current 
state of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.149 
II. AIDING RELIGIOUS UNIVERSITIES WITHOUT ADVANCING 
RELIGION 
This Part argues that revenue bond issues benefiting pervasively 
sectarian colleges possess the neutrality and intervening private 
choices that the Supreme Court has required in its recent Establish-
145. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809 (describing the roles of neutrality and private choice in 
the Court's prior Establishment Clause cases). 
146. Admittedly, the present inquiry presents an issue somewhat different than the 
Supreme Court's prior neutrality cases. In Zobrest, Witters, and Agostini, the government aid 
was neutrally available to individual students, regardless of what school each chose to attend. 
Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 3 (aid in the form of a sign language interpreter); Witters, 474 U.S. at 483 
(aid in the form of vocational rehabilitation assistance); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 209-10 (aid in 
the form of remedial instruction). In the case of conduit-financing transactions, the govern­
ment aid - revenue bonds - would be neutrally available to institutions, regardless of re­
ligious affiliation. The neutral availability of government aid must, therefore, have a some­
what different effect in determining the constitutionality of revenue bond issuances 
benefiting pervasively sectarian institutions. 
147. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 857-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
148. See Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 1 17 F. Supp. 2d at 710-16 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (de­
scribing Lipscomb University); Va. Coll. Bldg. Auth. v. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d 682, 684-86 (Va. 
2000) (describing Regent University). 
149. As suggested by Section I.B, the Supreme Court has undermined the basis for de­
fining pervasively sectarian institutions as those institutions where diversion is likely or 
where government aid would create a symbolic union between church and state. See 
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223-30. Therefore, a pervasively sectarian institution may now be de­
fined as an institution for which there is actual evidence that secular government aid would, 
in fact, subsidize religious indoctrination. 
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ment Clause jurisprudence. Neutrality is at the heart of the effect 
prong of the Lemon/Agostini test150 and, as this Part shows, is relevant 
in several respects. Section II.A focuses on the neutral availability of 
conduit financing, highlighting the importance of this evenhandedness 
in the ultimate determination of constitutionality. Section 11.B consid­
ers the role of private choice in revenue bond issuances, arguing that 
the intervening choice of private bond purchasers, although limited in 
scope, is further indication that these transactions are in accord with 
the Court's current Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Finally, Sec­
tion 11.C contends that revenue bond issuances benefiting pervasively 
sectarian institutions do not create an incentive for individuals to un­
dergo religious indoctrination and, thus, that these transactions satisfy 
the definition-of-recipients prong of the Agostini test. 
A. Revenue Bonds as Neutrally Available Government Aid 
This Section argues that revenue bond issuances possess the neu­
trality that the Supreme Court has emphasized in its recent Establish­
ment Clause jurisprudence, an important factor in the ultimate deter­
mination that these issuances do not violate the Establishment 
Clause's limitation on church-state interaction. The manner in which 
the government distributes aid - and, in particular, the degree to 
which such distribution is neutral toward religion - is important be­
cause of its relevance to the more fundamental issue of whether the 
government has a role in any religious indoctrination that may occur 
at the recipient institution. 151 When the Court determines that the 
government has distributed aid without considering recipients' relig­
ious affiliation, this finding supports the conclusion that religious in-
150. The focus of this Part is the "effect" prong of the Agostini test. Supreme Court ju­
risprudence has shown that the "purpose" prong is so easily satisfied that it is of little conse­
quence in the Establishment Clause analysis. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 808 (plurality opinion) 
(explaining that the Supreme Court did not consider the "purpose" of the program in ques­
tion because plaintiffs did not challenge the District Court's holding that the program had a 
secular purpose); Witters, 474 U.S. at 485 ("Our analysis relating to the first prong of that 
test is simple: all parties concede the unmistakably secular purpose of the Washington pro­
gram."); see also Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money: Santa Fe, 
Mitchell v. Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 
795 (2001) (noting that the purpose prong of the Lemon test often had "no effect"). 
In the case of conduit financing, the act under scrutiny would be that which created the 
Authority. Such acts typically have a clear secular purpose, such as the promotion and im­
provement of higher-education facilities within the state. See, e.g., Cal. Educ. Facilities Au th. 
v. Priest, 526 P.2d 513, 515 (Cal. 1974) (describing the purpose of the California Educational 
Facilities Authority Act as "providing private institutions of higher education within the 
state an additional means by which to expand, enlarge, and establish dormitory, academic, 
and related facilities, to finance such facilities, and to refinance existing facilities" (quoting 
Cal. Educ. Code § 30301 (currently codified as amended at Cal. Educ. Code § 94100 (West 
Supp. 2002))); Lynn, 538 S.E.2d at 687 (describing Va. Code Ann. § 23-30.39). 
151. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809 (plurality opinion) (discussing the "governmental indoc­
trination" prong of the Agostini test). 
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doctrination at the recipient institution does not result from govern­
ment action.152 "Neutrality" in this context refers to a specific form of 
neutrality: an "evenhandedness of distribution. "153 The Court's inquiry 
does not concern the degree to which the government aid is generally 
neutral toward religion but instead focuses on whether the govern­
ment allocates aid in a manner that is itself neutral toward religion.154 
By making aid available to applicants with a variety of views, religious 
or otherwise, the government avoids advancing any particular view.155 
Neutrality in this limited sense is a single factor for the Court to weigh 
along with the aid's other qualities.156 
In its application of this neutrality standard, the Court has ap­
proved of government programs that offer aid to any applicant, of any 
religion, who meets purely secular criteria. In Witters v. Washington 
Department of Services for the Blind,151 for example, the Court vali­
dated a state vocational assistance program that assisted individuals 
with visual handicaps in obtaining an education.158 The basic standard 
of eligibility for the state aid was a visual impairment; the selection of 
aid recipients, therefore, had nothing to do with religion. Similarly, in 
152. Id. at 809-10 (plurality opinion). 
153. Id. at 883 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10 (approving of a 
program "that distributes benefits neutrally to any child qualifying as 'disabled' under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, without regard to the 'sectarian-nonsectarian, or 
public-nonpublic nature' of the school the child attends"). 
154. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 883 (Souter, J., dissenting) The form of neutrality advocated 
by Justice Thomas in Mitchell is equality among secular and sectarian parties - a refusal to 
inquire into religious affiliation when distributing government aid. See id. at 809 ("[W]e have 
consistently turned to the principle of neutrality, upholding aid that is offered to a broad 
range of groups or persons without regard to their religion."). Moreover, Justice Thomas 
stressed in Mitchell that neutrality and private choice are typically necessary to ensure that 
no religious indoctrination may be attributed to the government. See, e.g. , id. at 811 (plural­
ity opinion) (contending that "private choices helped to ensure neutrality, and neutrality and 
private choices together eliminated any possible attribution to the government" in Zobrest). 
Thus, Professor Chemerinsky's fear that, under Justice Thomas's Mitchell standard, "a 
school could begin each day with a prayer so long as every religion got its due," is un­
founded. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Why the Rehnquist Court ls Wrong About the Establish­
ment Clause, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 221, 227 (2001). By requiring a period of religious reflec­
tion, this practice is not neutral toward secular or areligious interests, as Mitchell requires. 
155. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809-10 (plurality opinion) ("If the government is offering assis­
tance to recipients who provide, so to speak, a broad range of indoctrination, the govern­
ment itself is not thought responsible for any particular indoctrination."). 
156. Id. at 2581 (Souter, J., dissenting). As this Section stresses, facial neutrality is only 
one consideration in the Court's multi-layered analysis. A facially neutral program may still 
run afoul of the Establishment Clause by directly aiding an institution's religious functions 
(e.g., if a state or municipality made direct grants available to all universities - including 
pervasively sectarian universities such as Regent University and Lipscomb University) or by 
creating an excessive entanglement between church and state (e.g., if a loan agreement be­
tween a conduit issuer and a pervasively sectarian university gave the state the power to veto 
any award of tenure at the recipient university). 
157. 474 U.S. 481 (1986). 
158. Id. at 482-83. 
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Agostini v. Felton, the Court found neutrality in a program that sent 
public school teachers into parochial schools to provide remedial edu­
cation.159 The Court noted that Title I, which created the program, 
made aid available to any child who lived in a low-income area and 
was unlikely to meet the state's educational performance standards. 160 
Again, religious affiliation was not a factor in the allocation of gov­
ernment aid. 
Revenue bond issuances such as those in Lynn and Steele possess · 
the facial neutrality required by cases such as Witters and Agostini be­
cause the statutes authorizing revenue bond issuances allow for the in­
clusion of any private institution that can advance the conduit issuer's 
primary mission. In Lynn, for instance, the Educational Facilities 
Authority Act provided a loose standard of eligibility that did not sin­
gle out religious colleges and universities as being especially qualified 
for this form of government aid;161 quite the contrary, in fact, as the 
statute disfavored religious education.162 Similarly, the statute creating 
the issuing authority in Steele was so decidedly neutral that the plain­
tiffs did not bother to challenge its facial neutrality.163 
The possibility remains that, despite the facial neutrality of the 
statutes authorizing revenue bond issuances, a particular conduit is­
suer could distribute aid with a bias toward religious universities. This 
159. Agostini, 521 U.S. 203, 209 (1997). 
160. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 6315(b)(l)(B) (1994)). 
161 .  The Educational Facilities Authority Act empowers the Authority to issue bonds 
for "any of its corporate purposes," which include aiding "institutions for higher education." 
Va. Coll. Bldg. Auth. v. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d 682, 687 (quoting Va. Code. Ann. §§ 23-30.39, 
-.42(b) (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)). An "institution for higher education" is 
"[a] nonprofit educational institution within the Commonwealth (of Virginia] whose primary 
purpose is to provide collegiate or graduate education and not to provide religious training 
or theological education." Id. (quoting Va. Code Ann. § 23-30.41 (e) (2000) (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
162. See id. (excluding from eligibility "any facility used or to be used for sectarian in­
struction or as a place of religious worship [or] any facility which is used or to be used pri­
marily in connection with any part of the program or a school or department of divinity for 
any religious denomination" (quoting Va. Code Ann. § 23-30.41 (b) (internal quotation 
marks omitted))). 
163. Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 1 17 F. Supp. 2d 693, 723-24 (M.D. Tenn. 2000). As evi-
dence of the statute's facial neutrality, the Court quoted the act's declaration of purpose: 
It is the intent of the legislature by the passage of this chapter to authorize the incorporation 
in the several municipalities in this state of public corporations to finance, acquire, own, 
lease, and/or dispose of properties to the end that such corporations may be able to maintain 
and increase employment opportunities, increase the production of agricultural commodi­
ties, and increase the quantity of housing available in affected municipalities by promoting 
industry, trade, commerce, tourism, and recreation, agricultural and housing construction by 
inducing by inducing [sic] manufacturing, industrial, governmental, educational, financial, 
service, commercial, recreational and agricultural enterprises to locate in or remain in this 
state and further the use and production of its agricultural products and natural resources, 
and to vest such corporations with all powers that may be necessary to enable them to ac­
complish such purposes. 
Id. (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-53-102(a) (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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danger, inherent in any form of government aid, presents a different 
question from the constitutionality of such aid in principle. The 
Court's refusal to consider potential diversion of secular government 
aid to religious purposes suggests that the Court would likewise de­
cline to consider administrative bias absent a specific allegation to that 
effect.164 Any such bias would, of course, advance religion in violation 
of the Establishment Clause. The more pressing question is whether 
government aid violates the Establishment Clause when the govern­
ment allocates aid evenhandedly to both secular and religious institu­
tions. The facial neutrality of statutes authorizing such aid is one fac­
tor indicating that the government program does not contravene the 
Establishment Clause. 
The neutrality of statutes authorizing conduit issuances is no su­
perficial matter. It is evidence of the very rationale behind the legisla­
tive creation of such programs. This point is most obvious when one 
examines the revenue bond issuance from the perspective of the is­
suer.165 In most cases, the state creates the conduit issuer to further a 
particular secular purpose.166 The conduit issuer then offers to finance 
appropriate projects at any institution willing to aid the government in 
achieving its goal. When financing through the conduit issuer is avail­
able to all institutions, secular or religious, each resulting loan ar­
rangement between the issuer and the benefiting institution will have 
the effect of promoting the government's secular purpose. The aid is 
neutral in the sense that it uses all qualifying private volunteers to fur­
ther an overriding - and secular - government objective. 
When the recipient institution is pervasively sectarian, however, 
the question arises whether aid is still neutral when it has the concomi­
tant effect of advancing the recipient's religious agenda. This is the 
main charge of those who oppose revenue bond issuances that benefit 
religious institutions: that a facially neutral statute is decidedly not 
neutral when its aid lends direct support to religious activities.167 The 
immediate flaw with this argument is that it conflates one kind of neu­
trality with another. As noted above, the issue under the government 
indoctrination prong of the Lemon/Agostini test is not whether the 
government aid is neutral toward religion in general but whether it is 
164. See, e.g., Roemer v. Bd. Of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 761 (1976) (plurality opinion) 
("It has not been the Court's practice, in considering facial challenges to statutes of this kind, 
to strike them down in anticipation that particular applications may result in unconstitu­
tional use of funds."). 
165. Justice Thomas suggests and applies this perspective in Mitchell. See Mitchell v. 
Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809-10 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
166. With the bond issue under consideration here, that purpose is likely to be the pro­
motion of higher education within the state. 
167. See, e.g., Steele, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 716. 
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neutral toward applicants.168 The statute's overall neutrality toward 
religion is the issue of ultimate constitutional concern and, as such, 
cannot be settled with a single prong of the multi-prong 
Lemon/Agostini test. The Court uses this more narrow form of neu­
trality in determining whether it may reasonably attribute religious in­
doctrination to the government. 
Besides this confusion about the meaning of neutrality, this argu­
ment fails to account for the fact that the Court has permitted aid that 
does, in fact, advance religion in some way. For example, while the 
Court has prohibited the government from directly advancing the re­
ligious mission of sectarian institutions, 169 it has not extended this pro­
hibition to indirect aid.170 Indeed, the Supreme Court has rejected the 
idea that such a broad proscription is even possible.171 After all, 
Everson v. Board of Education held in 1947 that the First Amendment 
did not prohibit a board of education from reimbursing parents of 
children attending private schools for bus transportation costs.172 The 
Court reasoned that the state must at least permit religious institutions 
to benefit from public services such as police and fire protection that 
are available to all.173 While "cutting off church schools from these 
services" would guarantee that the state had absolutely no role in the 
persistence of religious activities,174 the Court concluded that the only 
168. For a thorough overview of the different uses of the concept of "neutrality" in the 
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, see Justice Souter's dissent in 
Mitchell. 530 U.S. at 878-84. He identifies three distinct uses of the term "neutral," corre­
sponding roughly to three phases in the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. As 
originally used in Everson, "neutrality" was "a term for government in its required median 
position between aiding and handicapping religion." Id. at 879. Next, the Court used "neu­
trality" to identify aid that was secular, or nonreligious, in content. Id. at 880. In this sense, 
neutrality connotes not the optimal government position vis-a-vis religion but the nature of 
permissible government aid. Finally, neutrality came to mean to "evenhanded," or a distri­
bution of aid without regard to recipients' religious affiliation. Id. at 881 Justice Souter ar­
gues that the Mitchell plurality equates the third kind of neutrality with the first, improperly 
treating evenhandedness as a "stand-alone criterion." See id. at 883-84. 
169. See, e.g., Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986) 
("It is . . .  well settled . . .  that the State may not grant aid to a religious school, whether cash 
or in kind, where the effect of the aid is 'that of a direct subsidy to the religious school' from 
the State." (quoting Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 394 (1993)); Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606-07 (1971) (overturning a Pennsylvania program that partially 
reimbursed parochial schools for the costs of providing instruction in secular subjects and a 
Rhode Island program supplying direct financial support to teachers of secular subjects in 
private schools). 
170. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 486-87. 
171. See, e.g. , Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993) ("We have 
never said that 'religious institutions are disabled by the First Amendment from participat­
ing in publicly sponsored social welfare programs.' "(quoting Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 
589, 609 (1988)). 
172. 330 U.S. 1 (1947); see also Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, The Establish­
ment of Religion, 5 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 21.4 (3d ed. 1999). 
173. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17-18. 
174. Id. at 18. 
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neutral position for the state toward religion is to provide those public 
services that allow religious institutions to function on a minimal 
level.175 Anything less, the Court reasoned, would amount to hostility 
toward religion176 - an impermissible result under the First Amend­
ment. As indicated by Everson, the Supreme Court's Establishment 
Clause standard requires courts to ask not only whether government 
aid advances religion but how religion is advanced - and, more im­
portantly, what role the government plays in that advancement. 
Admittedly, the Court placed greater emphasis on the character of 
the recipients of government aid in its Tilton-era Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, holding in Lemon, for example, that the government 
must limit aid to the beneficiary's "secular, neutral, or nonideological" 
functions.177 The rule that the government must aid the secular without 
advancing the religious functions explains the Court's prior concern 
with pervasive sectarianism, as the Court reasoned that the govern­
ment could not aid pervasively sectarian institutions without directly 
supporting their religious agenda.178 In recent opinions, however, the 
Court has focused less on the religious character of aid recipients and 
more on the neutral and indirect nature of government aid.179 In Wit­
ters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,180 the Court 
approved aid that allowed an individual with a visual impairment to 
"study[] the Bible, ethics, speech, and church administration in order 
to equip himself for a career as a pastor, missionary, or youth direc­
tor. "181 The aid in Witters not only facilitated one individual's religious 
instruction but, in financing the aid recipient's seminary training, con­
tributed to the perpetuation of his religion.182 Nevertheless, the Court 
found that because the aid recipient chose to use "neutrally available 
state aid" to pay for his education at Inland Empire School of the Bi­
ble, it could not attribute the recipient's religious training to the gov­
ernment.183 
Witters highlighted the fact that neutral availability is a single fac­
tor in the overall determination of whether the government has played 
175. Id.; see also Nowck & Rotunda supra note 172, § 21.4 (describing the Everson ra­
tionale). 
176. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 ("State power is no more to be used so as to handicap re-
ligions than it is to favor them."). 
177. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971). 
178. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973). 
179. See Lark & Groves, supra note 21, at 188. 
180. 474 U.S. 481 (1985). 
181. Id. at 483. 
182. The petitioner in Witters was training "to become a pastor, missionary, or youth 
director," id. at 489, indicating that his intention was to disseminate or at least perpetuate his 
religious beliefs. 
183. Id. at 489. 
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a role in religious indoctrination. Thus, when the government distrib­
utes aid without regard to the religious affiliation of potential benefi­
ciaries, this neutrality is one factor suggesting that the aid program is 
constitutional. Statutes empowering conduit issuers to issue revenue 
bonds on behalf of private entities possess this neutrality because they 
do not discriminate between potential recipients based on religious af­
filiation. This determination of facial neutrality is an initial step to­
ward the ultimate goal of deciding whether pervasively sectarian insti­
tutions' participation in conduit financing arrangements is neutral in 
the sense mandated by the Establishment Clause. 
B.  Bond Purchasers and Private Choice 
This Section contends that, although revenue bond issuances limit 
bond purchasers to choosing only whether to buy bonds for a prede­
termined beneficiary, this narrow choice nevertheless supplies the 
element of private choice that the Supreme Court has required in its 
recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The Court's private choice 
analysis focuses on the method through which the government allo­
cates aid to a particular institution. The Court has approved govern­
ment aid that is both neutral and distributed to religious institutions 
through the decisions of individual citizens, 184 thereby drawing a sharp 
distinction between aid programs that provide public funds directly to 
religious institutions185 and those programs that distribute aid to indi­
viduals who then - independently and privately - may decide to use 
that aid toward religious education.186 This rule is based on the ration­
ale that, when a government program allocates aid to an individual 
who is then free to use this aid in the setting of his or her choice, any 
religious indoctrination to which the individual is subject is not attrib­
utable to the government.187 These programs are an easy case, for both 
184. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. 
Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); 
Indeed, the plurality in Mitchell not only recognized the connection between neutrality and 
private choice but emphasized the importance of both neutrality and private choice to the 
ultimate determination of constitutionality. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 812 (2000) 
(noting the importance of neutrality, private choice, and "the relationship between the 
two."); id. (finding that "neutrality and private choices together eliminated any possible at­
tribution to the government." (emphasis added)). 
185. See, e.g., Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) 
(grants to nonpublic schools). 
186. See, e.g., Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 3 (grants to disabled students); see also 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at § 12.2.6.2 (describing the distinction between aid provided 
directly to an institution and aid distributed to students). 
187. See, e.g. , Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 811 (plurality opinion) (describing the logic of the 
neutrality/private choice standard); Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 3 (approving federal provision of a 
sign-language interpreter to a student at a Catholic high school); Witters, 474 U.S. at 483 
(approving aid for a visually impaired student at a private, Christian college). 
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the neutrality of the government aid and the individual's role in de­
termining the ultimate destination of the government aid are clear.188 
Programs in which the private choice played a subtler role have 
also passed constitutional muster. In Agostini v. Felton,189 the Supreme 
Court considered Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act of 1965, which provided federal funds to "local educational agen­
cies. "190 These local agencie's were to use this aid to finance remedial 
education and counseling programs.191 In its use of Title I funds, the 
Board of Education of the City of New York, a local educational 
agency, sent public teachers to religious schools to provide instruction 
in secular subjects. 192 The Court found the role of private choice in this 
program "indistinguishable" from its role in the Zobrest and Witters 
programs: "Both programs make aid available only to eligible recipi­
ents. That aid is provided to students at whatever school they choose 
to attend."193 Agostini makes clear, then, that Witters and Zobrest do 
not stand for the proposition that private choice is present only when 
the government provides a benefit to an individual who then allocates 
that aid to the school of his choice. Rather, the private choice analysis 
requires courts to determine whether government aid runs to religious 
institutions as the result of individual choices - even if the institution 
then applies that aid collectively.194 As the plurality stated in Mitchell, 
private choice is most apparent when government aid is given directly 
to individuals who then allocate that aid to religious institutions, but 
"there is no reason why the Establishment Clause requires such a 
form."195 
Lynn and Steele evince a sharp difference of opinion over whether 
government loans funded by revenue bonds involve an element of pri­
vate choice. In Lynn, the Virginia Supreme Court found private 
choice in the fact that all funds flowing to the recipient college were 
raised through the conduit issuance of revenue bonds, and, thus, con­
sisted entirely of the private assets of bond purchasers. The court rea­
soned that "[i]f no private investors purchase bonds issued on behalf 
188. See, e.g., Zobrest, 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993); Witters, 474 U.S. at 488 (1985); see also 
Monsma, supra note 83, at 323 (identifying the neutrality/public choice combination as one 
of "two lines of legal reasoning" that the Court has utilized in approving government aid to 
sectarian institutions). 
189. 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
190. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 209-10. 
191. Id. at 209 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 6315(c)(l)(A)). 
192. Id. at 210. 
193. Id. at 228. 
194. See id. (noting that the distinction between a benefit flowing to one individual and 
a benefit flowing to multiple individuals is constitutionally insignificant). 
195. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 816 (2000). 
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of Regent, no funds flow to Regent."196 According to the Virginia 
Supreme Court's logic in Lynn, it is the intervening private choice of 
investors, rather than that of the government authority, that allocates 
government aid to the recipient institution.197 The court found that, 
because this decision concerns a potential investment, bond purchas­
ers are more likely to consider "market factors and personal circum­
stances" than religious considerations.198 In contrast, Steele rejected al­
together the contention that bond purchasers contribute a private 
choice element to the constitutional analysis. For the district court, it is 
the Board (the conduit issuer) rather than the private investor who de­
termines which institutions may benefit from government-issued reve­
nue bonds.199 Unlike the petitioners in Zobrest and Witters, bond pur­
chasers "could not select which institution they wanted to receive the 
funds."200 In other words, a purchaser seeking to benefit from the tax­
free interest of revenue bonds is stuck with the recipient institutions 
selected by the conduit issuer. According to Steele's analysis, then, 
revenue bond transactions involve an intervening third party but fail 
to leave that party any meaningful choice in the allocation of aid. 
Notwithstanding the district court's conclusion in Steele that the 
private choice of bond purchasers has limited significance for the con­
stitutional inquiry, this choice nevertheless fulfills an important role in 
the distribution of government aid. Indeed, the Virginia Supreme 
Court found in Lynn that, although the bond purchaser's private 
choice consists simply of deciding whether or not to purchase bonds 
issued on behalf of a particular institution, this restricted choice was 
enough for Establishment Clause purposes.201 A binary, "yes-or-no" 
choice differs in an obvious sense from the private choice of Zobrest 
and Witters, in which the government predetermines only the form of 
aid and allows individuals to distribute it to whom they choose. Never­
theless, the Lynn court found that this limited form of private choice is 
in accord with the logic of the private choice analysis,202 a conclusion 
that holds up when one considers the primary role of private choice in 
the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Private 
196. Va. Coll. Bldg. Auth. v. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d 682, 698 (Va. 2000). 
197. Id. 
198. Id. at 699; see also DENNIS ZIMMERMAN, THE PRIVATE USE OF TAX-EXEMPT 
BONDS 74-75 (Urban Institute Press, 1991) ("Tax-exempt bonds are purchased primarily by 
households, commercial banks, property and casualty insurance companies, and open-end 
bond funds. All of these investors are motivated primarily by the tax-exempt interest. These 
investors tend to move in and out of the municiR�l bond market as their need for sheltering 
income from taxation rises and falls and the tax treatment of the interest income changes."). 
199. Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 117 F. Supp. 2d 693, at 724-25 (M.D. Tenn. 2000). 
200. Id. at 725. 
201. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d at 698-99. 
202. Id. 
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choice, according to the Mitchell plurality, prevents the government 
from "grant[ing] special favors that might lead to a religious estab­
lishment,"203 and counters any tendency for government programs to 
favor "pre-existing recipients."204 More fundamentally, private choice 
ensures that religious indoctrination is an individual rather than gov­
ernmental choice.205 
Given this understanding of the function of private choice, Lynn's 
binary choice fails in one respect. A yes-or-no choice clearly cannot 
allocate government aid (entitlement to benefit from a revenue bond 
issue) to those colleges and universities whose proposals have been 
rejected by the conduit issuer. Aside from the usual market forces, 
then, bond purchasers' choices do not have the effect of redistributing 
aid. They can, however, achieve other important goals. These inter­
vening choices operate as a public check on the government, allowing 
investors to veto any attempt by the government to grant "special fa­
vors" to particular religious organizations.206 Moreover, the bond pur­
chasers' role undermines the appearance of government endorse­
ment,207 and, as the Virginia Supreme Court noted in Lynn, guarantees 
that no money is loaned to religious institutions unless private inves­
tors have consented - and have supplied the necessary funds.208 
Ultimately, investors' private choices are only relevant to the con­
stitutional analysis insofar as they distance the government from any 
religious indoctrination that may take place at a recipient institution,209 
and, in this regard, the Court has looked to private choice and neutral 
availability together.210 In the case of revenue bond issuances, acts 
authorizing government authorities to release revenue bonds possess 
the facial neutrality called for by the Supreme Court's modern Estab­
lishment Clause jurisprudence.211 The private choice of the bond pur­
chasers, although more narrow in scope than the private choice in 
Zobrest and Witters, is a check against government bias, ensuring that 
the government's role in allocating aid is not exclusive. Revenue bond 
issuances therefore include an important, though limited, element of 
private choice. 
203. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 810 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
204. Id. (plurality opinion). 
205. Id. at 811(plurality opinion) (stating that private choice in Zobrest ensured that any 
government worker found in a sectarian institution was there "only as a result of the private 
decision of individual parents" (internal citation omitted)). 
206. Id. at 810 (plurality opinion). 
207. See id. at 810. 
208. See supra note 196. 
209. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810-11 (plurality opinion). 
210. Id. (plurality opinion). 
211. See, e.g. , Va. Coll. Bldg. Auth. v. Lynn, 583 S.E.2d 682, 687 (Va. 2000) (citing Va. 
Code §§ 23-30-39, -42). 
1 140 Michigan Law Review 
C. Neutral Distribution of Aid and Incentive 
[Vol. 100:1108 
This Section argues that, because any institution may benefit from 
a revenue bond issuance, this form of government aid does not create 
an incentive for students to undergo religious indoctrination. The 
Supreme Court examines the method by which an aid program defines 
its recipients in determining whether it violates the Establishment 
Clause.212 At first blush, this prong seems to ask the same question as 
the initial neutrality test. Indeed, the definition of recipients prong 
"looks to the same set of facts" as the neutrality test.213 This incentive 
inquiry, however, "uses those facts to answer a somewhat different 
question: whether the criteria for allowing the aid 'create[ s] a financial 
incentive to undertake religious indoctrination.' "214 The Court has ar­
ticulated an almost bright-line rule in this area: no incentive is present 
when the government allocates aid without concern for the religious 
affiliation of potential aid recipients.215 
In applying thi's rule, the Court has upheld aid programs that assist 
all eligible students at any school, religious or secular.216 In Agostini, 
for example, the Court concluded that the Board of Education's Title 
I services did not create an incentive for students to undertake relig­
ious indoctrination because Title I services were available to all chil­
dren "no matter what their religious beliefs or where they go to 
school."217 Similarly, the Court found no incentive in Witters because 
the government program did not provide any particular benefits to in­
dividuals who chose to attend a sectarian institution.218 
The application of this rule to revenue bond issuances differs in 
some respects from its use in Zobrest,219 Witters,220 and Agostini.221 In 
212. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 231 (1997). 
213. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 813 (plurality opinion); see also Agostini, 521 U.S. at 230-31 
(noting that the criteria used to determine whether the recipient's use of government aid to 
indoctrinate could be attributed to the state are also pertinent to the issue of whether the 
program creates a "financial incentive to undertake religious indoctrination"). 
214. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 813 (plurality opinion) (quoting Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231 (al­
teration in original)). 
215. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231; see also Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 813 (plurality opinion) (de­
scribing Agostini's incentive analysis as a "rule"). 
216. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231 (citing Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 ,  
10 (1993); Mueller v .  Allen, 436 U.S. 388, 398-399 (1983); Bd. of  Ed. of  Central Sch. Dist. 
No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1968); Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 1 6-18 
(1947)). 
217. Id. at 232 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 6312(c)(l)(F)). 
218. Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986). Instead, the 
program allowed participants to choose from "a huge variety of possible careers, of which 
only a small handful are sectarian." Id. ; see also Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10 (finding no incentive 
where students could use a government-paid interpreter at the school of their choice). 
219. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10. 
220. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 488. 
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Zobrest and Witters, the central issue was whether the government aid 
to the individual student created an incentive for the student to choose 
religious indoctrination at a sectarian school.222 Revenue bond issu­
ances benefiting religious universities require courts to consider in­
stead whether the government aid (a loan financed with revenue 
bonds) to the school creates an incentive for the student to choose the 
recipient school. The incentive analysis, therefore, asks the following 
in this case: Since revenue bond issuances allow benefiting universities 
to improve facilities, does this aid attract students to the university, 
thereby contributing to the indoctrination of students who would oth­
erwise have attended another university? 
Lynn, applying the Agostini rule, found that the program did not 
create an incentive because it was open to "all qualifying institutions 
of higher education without regard to religious affiliation."223 The 
court reasoned that, because any university could take advantage of 
this special form of financing, there was no reason to believe that per­
vasively sectarian institutions were more likely to participate and 
therefore more likely to gain a competitive advantage (with cheaper 
loans) over nonsectarian institutions.224 This conclusion is in line with 
the Supreme Court's current standard. The Agostini rule looks only at 
whether the aid is neutrally available.225 That the aid may then benefit 
the recipient institution - and consequently make the university more 
attractive to potential students - is irrelevant to the Court's analysis. 
Because any university can finance construction and improvements in 
the same way, pervasively sectarian institutions have no particular 
competitive advantage. In short, the Agostini rule looks only at neu­
trality and statutes authorizing these conduit issuances neither favor 
nor disfavor religion. 
III. THE LIMITED CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIP IN CONDUIT 
FINANCING 
This Part contends that the ultimate relationship between a state 
or municipality and a religious university benefiting from a revenue 
bond-funded loan is so attenuated that, in light of the neutrality estab­
lished in Part II, such aid does not raise any legitimate Establishment 
Clause concerns. Section III.A argues that, because a loan funded by a 
revenue bond issuance does not include any public funds, the only 
government aid to the recipient institution is that the university - due 
221. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232. 
222. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10; Witters, 474 U.S. at 488. 
223. Va. Coll. Bldg. Auth. v. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d 682, 698 (Va. 2000). 
224. See id. 
225. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231. 
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to the tax exemption accorded to revenue bond purchasers - may fi­
nance an improvement at a lower cost than if that entity had obtained 
a private loan. This benefit, as well as the government's involvement 
in allocating and monitoring the benefit, is too indirect to constitute 
excessive entanglement. Section 111.B examines the church-state rela­
tionship in conduit bond issuances benefiting pervasively sectarian 
transactions through the lens of the endorsement test, demonstrating 
that an authority's decision to issue revenue bonds on behalf of a per­
vasively sectarian university is not an act of government endorse­
ment.226 
A. Excessive Entanglement: Government Loans Without Public 
Funds 
This Section demonstrates that the church-state relationship in 
conduit-financing arrangements involving pervasively sectarian uni­
versities is too attenuated to violate the excessive entanglement prong 
of the Agostini test. Generally, the excessive entanglement test calls 
for the Court to examine "the character and purposes of the institu­
tions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, 
and the resulting relationship between the government and religious 
authority."227 The Court's excessive entanglement inquiry concerns 
two distinct forms of entanglement: administrative and political entan­
glement.228 Administrative entanglement may be present where "[a] 
comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance" is 
required to ensure that secular aid remains secular in effect.229 Political 
entanglement, on the other hand, is possible where government aid to 
religious institutions is likely to bring about "political division along 
religious lines. "230 
As the Court acknowledged in Agostini, this entanglement inquiry 
has relaxed to some degree in recent Establishment Clause cases.231 
"Administrative cooperation" and political divisiveness are now "in­
sufficient by themselves to create an 'excessive entanglement.' "232 
Thus, even the need for the government to monitor the distribution 
and subsequent use of government aid in order to make certain that 
226. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 592 
(1989) (describing the "endorsement" test). 
227. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
228. STONE ET AL., supra note 68, at 1588. 
229. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619. 
230. Id. at 622. 
231. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233-34. 
232. Id. at 234. 
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no diversion occurs does not necessarily lead to excessive entangle­
ment under the Court's current Establishment Clause standard. 
Moreover, in rejecting the presumption that recipients will divert pub­
lic aid to further religious indoctrination, the Court has "discard[ ed] 
the assumption that pervasive monitoring [of aid recipients] is re­
quired."233 Because the Supreme Court has not found an excessive 
church-state entanglement in any post-Agostini cases, it is unclear 
what factors are necessary to establish an excessive church-state en­
tanglement. The Agostini dictum,234 however, leaves open the possi­
bility that the presence of administrative cooperation, political divi­
siveness, as well as some form of monitoring or oversight, would 
violate this prong of the Lemon/Agostini test if the Court deemed this 
combination of factors to be excessive. 
The first element of the excessive entanglement test, the nature of 
the institution, is a given for purposes of this Note: the universities at 
issue are so sectarian in nature that it is impossible for the government 
to aid only their secular functions, despite the fact that any govern­
ment aid would be purely secular in content.235 Having determined the 
nature of the institutions likely to benefit from this government aid, it 
is possible to turn to the second element of the excessive entanglement 
inquiry: the nature of government aid involved in revenue bond issu­
ances. Justice Powell, writing for a majority in Hunt v. McNair, pro­
vided an apt description of the type of aid at issue: 
The "state aid" involved in this case is of a very special sort. We have 
here no expenditure of public funds, either by grant or loan, no reim­
bursement by a State for expenditures made by a parochial school or 
college, and no extending or committing of a State's credit. Rather, the 
only state aid consists, not of financial assistance directly or indirectly 
which would implicate public funds or credit, but the creation of an in­
strumentality (the Authority) through which educational institutions may 
borrow funds on the basis of their own credit and the security of their own 
property upon more favorable interest terms than otherwise would be 
available. The Supreme Court of New Jersey characterized the assistance 
rendered an educational institution under an act generally similar to the 
South Carolina Act as merely being a "governmental service." The South 
Carolina Supreme Court, in the opinion below, described the role of the 
State as that of a "mere conduit."236 
233. Id. 
234. Id. 
235. See Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 1 17 F. Supp 2d 693, 734 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (finding 
that Lipscomb University is pervasively sectarian); Va. Coll. Bldg. Auth. v. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d 
682, 698 (Va. 2000) (finding that Regent University is pervasively sectarian according to the 
standard articulated in Tilton); As Part I argues, the Court's Tilton-era standard would have 
presumptively disqualified such an institution from government aid. 
236. 413 U.S. 734, 745 n.7 (1973) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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Justice Powell's characterization of the state aid provided by a conduit 
issuer makes an important distinction for the present analysis: the aid 
at issue does not involve any public funds. That is, a loan funded di­
rectly237 or indirectly238 by revenue bonds does not include any tax­
payer dollars. It is not the loan to the pervasively sectarian institution, 
therefore, that raises constitutional concerns. Rather, according to 
Justice Powell, the only state aid is the creation of the conduit issuer 
itself and the possibility that a particular institution may borrow at a 
more favorable rate than that available through private financing. 
When constitutional inquiry focuses on this difference between 
funding with revenue bonds and private financing, two key factors 
come into focus. First, any benefit received by a religious university 
stems from the independent benefit received by both private bond 
purchasers and the issuing authority. Indeed, it is only by making a 
cheaper loan available to private entities such as religiously oriented 
universities that an issuing authority is able to promote its legislative 
agenda at all.239 This fact does not support the argument that only 
bondholders, rather than the pervasively sectarian university, benefit 
from the conduit issuance.240 A loan funded by revenue bonds, because 
it is a relatively inexpensive form of financing, provides a clear finan­
cial benefit to the university on whose behalf the bonds were issued. It 
does, however, mean that a recipient university is not the only benefi­
ciary and may not even be the primary beneficiary. 
Second, any benefit received by a religious university is due to the 
tax exemption granted to private bond purchasers.241 The benefit is not 
237. E.g. , Johnson v. Econ. Dev. Corp., 241 F.3d 501, 505 (2001) (describing a revenue 
bond issuance in which proceeds from a completed bond sale were loaned to the recipient 
entity). 
238. See, e.g. , Steele, 1 17 F. Supp. 2d at 717 ("In reality, the government Authority issu­
ing the bonds does not involve itself in all the financial details of the transaction. Instead, the 
Authority arranges to borrow the bond proceed amount from a bank at the time of the bond 
issuance. The Authority names the bank as the trustee of the bond issue, and the bank dis­
perses the money 'borrowed' by the Authority to the Entity. In return, the Authority assigns 
its interest in the loan to the Entity to the bank, so that the Entity is repaying the bank di­
rectly."). 
239. See Hunt, 413 U.S. at 739 (noting the role of the income tax exemption to the issu­
ing authority). 
240. The defendants in Steele had advanced this claim. See Steele, 117 F. Supp 2d at 717-
18. In response, the court found that "[a]Ithough the bond holders did benefit financially 
from the tax-exempt nature of the municipal bonds, that is not the only benefit that accrued 
in this case . . . .  Lipscomb has repeatedly stated that it received a substantial benefit from 
the tax-exempt bonds . . .  and that it could not have completed the project if it had not been 
granted the benefit . . . .  " Id. ; see also Jeffrey Selingo, Judge Rejects Tax-Free Bonds for Re-
ligious University, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. Nov. 10, 2000, at A3 (noting that Lipscomb 
University's lawyer, Bradley MaClean, argued that the district court "improperly applied 
[the 'pervasively sectarian' test] because bondholders, not the university itself, directly re­
ceived the tax benefits"). 
241. See supra text accompanying note 20. 
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a direct grant or subsidy but is instead derived from an exemption 
from a government-imposed burden. Admittedly, the difference be­
tween a loan funded by revenue bonds and a loan obtained on the pri­
vate market may be significant. According to one estimate, for exam­
ple, the revenue bond issue approved in Lynn saved Regent "about 
$30 million in interest over the 30-year life of the loan."242 Because this 
gain results from the government's consent to excuse private bond 
purchasers from a governmentally imposed loss, however, it cannot be 
equivalent to a direct grant or subsidy. Walz v. Tax Commission man­
dates this conclusion.243 In holding that the New York City Tax Com­
mission did not violate the First Amendment by granting property tax 
exemptions to religious organizations, Chief Justice Burger, writing 
for the Court, found a fundamental difference between exemptions 
from taxation and direct subsidies: "The grant of a tax exemption is 
not sponsorship since the government does not transfer part of its 
revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding that the 
church support the state . . . .  There is no genuine nexus between tax 
exemption and the establishment of religion."244 The gain realized by 
religious universities in revenue bond issuances is an even more indi­
rect economic benefit245 than that contemplated in Walz, as revenue 
bonds exempt the interest realized by the bond purchaser - and not 
the profit realized by the recipient university - from taxation. 
Despite the clarity of Hunt and Walz, opponents of transactions 
such as those at issue in Lynn and Steele have attempted in various 
ways to characterize the government assistance in these cases as a 
form of direct aid. In Steele, the District Court for the Middle District 
of Tennessee supported its finding that loans funded by revenue bonds 
are a form of direct aid by arguing that the Supreme Court itself had 
recognized such aid as direct.246 The court contended that, in 
Rosenberger v. Rector of the University of Virginia,241 the Supreme 
Court cited Hunt "as one of the cases correctly cited by the Court of 
Appeals establishing 'the principle that we have recognized special Es­
tablishment Clause dangers where the government makes direct 
money payments to sectarian institutions. '  "248 Given that the Court 
242. Regent Press Release, supra note 22, at 1 .  
243. 397 U.S. 664 (1970); see also Lark, supra note 29, at  177 (predicting that the 
Mitchell plurality, if faced with the constitutional issue presented in cases such as Steele and 
Lynn, "would conclude that the program is an indirect tax exemption governed by Walz"). 
244. Walz, 397 U.S. at 675. 
245. Id. at 674-75. 
246. Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 1 17 F. Supp. 2d 693, 719-20 (M.D. Tenn. 2000). 
247. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
248. Steele, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 720 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the 
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842 (1995)). The passage from Rosenberger reads: "The Court 
of Appeals (and the dissent) are correct to extract from our decisions the principle 
1146 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:1108 
expressly noted in Hunt that aid funded by a revenue bond issuance is 
not financial aid at all - direct or indirect249 - it is likely that the 
Court was stating in Rosenberger that Hunt, like Roemer and Tilton, 
recognizes the general principle that direct aid to sectarian institutions 
entails special Establishment Clause dangers. 
Those opposed to bond issuances benefiting pervasively sectarian 
institutions have also attempted to raise a constitutional issue by dis­
regarding the significance of the revenue bond issuance itself. In 
Steele, for instance, the court found that the money received by 
Lipscomb through the bond issuance was, in essence, nothing more 
than a loan: "Lipscomb went to the Board in order to get a low­
interest government loan, and that is exactly what it received."250 The 
bond issuance, in the court's analysis, was "simply the financing tool 
through which the government was able to collect funds sufficient to 
meet the $15,000,000 agreed to in the loan."251 Even assuming that the 
government aid consisted of the entire loan rather than only the dif­
ference between revenue bond-funded financing and private financing 
as suggested above, there is a flaw in the district court's characteriza­
tion. Because the substance of the loan, the money itself, came from 
private investors rather from than the government, the loan is not 
from the government. As the Supreme Court noted in Hunt, the gov­
ernment is a conduit in the loan transaction,252 channeling money from 
bond purchasers to the recipient entity. Although an entity such as 
Lipscomb may approach a government authority seeking a relatively 
low-cost loan, the authority was initially set up by the state legislature 
in order to promote and facilitate such transactions. A pervasively sec­
tarian university seeking a cost-effective method of financing an im­
provement can only approach a conduit issuer because the state legis­
lature initially made such an authority available for parties considering 
projects meeting the legislature's secular agenda. In this light, it is un­
reasonable to view the transaction solely as one that benefits the re­
cipient university; the authority - and thus the state - receives a de­
liberately sought-after benefit as well. 
that we have recognized special Establishment Clause dangers where the government 
makes direct money payments to sectarian institutions . . . . " Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 842. 
(citing Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 742 (1973)). 
249. See Hunt, 413 U.S. at 745 n.7 ("Rather, the only state aid consists, not of financial 
assistance directly or indirectly which would implicate public funds or credit, but the creation 
of an instrumentality . . . .  "). 
250. Steele, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 717. 
251. Id.; see also id. at 720 (finding that the loan was a direct benefit to Lipscomb Uni­
versity because the government "chose to provide Lipscomb with low-interest financing 
through a loan agreement"). 
252. See Hunt, 413 U.S. at 745 n.7 (noting with apparent approval that a lower court 
viewed the state's role in a revenue bond issuance "as that of a 'mere conduit' " (quoting 
Hunt v. McNair, 187 S.E.2d 645, 650 (S.C. 1972)). 
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Critics have also argued that the actual benefit received by a re­
cipient university as defined in the Hunt footnote - the difference be­
tween the revenue bond-financed loan and a private loan - is itself a 
form of direct aid because the state is deprived of the tax revenue it 
would have acquired had the university been forced to seek out pri­
vate sources of financial assistance.253 That is, due to the tax-free inter­
est on revenue bonds, the state loses revenue that would have been 
paid on the interest of a private loan.254 This position has little merit in 
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Walz v. Tax Commission.255 
The Court ruled in Walz that a tax exemption is not a form of direct 
aid to religious organizations because an exemption only requires the 
government to refrain from imposing a burden on the church.256 Be­
cause no public funds are transferred in a loan funded by revenue 
bonds, the tax exemption is only an indirect economic benefit.257 
Granted, the exemption in a revenue bond issuance differs from 
the exemption considered in Walz in two senses. A revenue bond issu­
ance requires a different sort of activity from the government. The 
government does not "simply abstain" from taxing the recipient insti­
tution but instead authorizes and structures a transaction having that 
effect.258 The difference between this authorization and the legislative 
action behind a tax exemption of the kind considered in Walz, how­
ever, is not great considering that both exemptions require explicit 
legislative authorization.259 Revenue bond issuances merely require 
one additional authorization - that of the authority empowered to is­
sue such bonds - before the administration of the transaction is 
253. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 6 & 
n.7, Johnson v. Econ. Dev. Corp., 241 F.3d 501 (6th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-1884) [hereinafter 
Petitioner's Brief]. 
254. See id. at 6-7: 
The issuance of tax-exempt revenue bonds . . .  for the benefit of a religious school is not an 
"indirect tax benefit," but instead is a direct subsidy in the form of substantially lower inter­
est payments on the loan. And this direct subsidy to the religious school is indeed paid for by 
"public funds" in the form of lost revenue to the (state J treasury from the non-tax-exempt in­
terest it would have received had the construction been financed by a commercial loan. 
Cf Walz, 397 U.S. 664, 667 (1970): 
The essence of the appellant's contention was that the New York City Tax Commission's 
grant of an exemption to church property indirectly requires the appellant to make a contri­
bution to religious bodies and thereby violates provisions prohibiting establishment of re­
ligion under the First Amendment which under the Fourteenth Amendment is binding on 
States. 
255. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
256. Id. at 675. 
257. See id. at 674. 
258. Cf id. at 675 (describing a tax exemption as the state "simply abstain(ing]" from 
imposing a financial burden). 
259. See id. at 666-67 (citing N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 1, which authorizes the tax exemp­
tion). 
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turned over to other parties such as the trustee and underwriter.260 
Second, revenue bond issuances differ from a tax exemption such as 
that evaluated in Walz because revenue bond issuances exempt the in­
terest gained by bond purchasers rather than any funds received by 
the religious institution itself. Any benefit derived by religious institu­
tions, however, stems directly from the tax exemption accorded to 
bond purchasers. The tax exemption therefore benefits the religious 
institution receiving a less expensive loan as much as it does the bond 
purchasers who directly benefit from the exemption - and only be­
cause of the exemption given to bond purchasers. 
Some commentators have concluded that the government's indi­
rect aid via the issuance of revenue bonds directly assists the recipient 
institution in its religious mission because, in providing financial sup­
port to an institution's secular functions, this aid allows the institution 
to devote more of its financial resources to indoctrination.261 The 
Court has unfailingly rejected this line of reasoning.262 Indeed, if the 
argument had any merit, the Court could never have approved aid to 
the secular functions of even merely sectarian schools, as any such aid 
would have the effect of leaving the school with more resources to 
spend on religious indoctrination. 
As Hunt makes clear then,263 the nature of government aid in a 
revenue bond issuance is limited to the creation of the authority em­
powered to issue revenue bonds and the subsequent difference be­
tween the cost of a loan funded by revenue bonds and the likely cost 
of a private loan. This difference is attributable solely to the tax ex­
emption for interest received by bond purchasers and, according to 
Walz, a tax exemption is at best an indirect economic benefit.264 
Under the final element of the excessive entanglement analysis, it 
is necessary to consider the relationship between church and state that 
ensues from a revenue bond-funded loan. While a revenue bond issu­
ance clearly involves some degree of interaction between a pervasively 
sectarian institution and the government through the conduit issuer, 
church-state interaction qua church-state interaction does not neces-
260. See infra Part 111.B. 
261. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 693 (1971) (Douglas, J.,  dissenting in part) 
(arguing that "[m]oney not spent for one purpose becomes available for other purposes"). 
262. See Roemer v. Bd. Of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976) (plurality opinion) 
(stating that, while the Court acknowledges that aiding a religious institution's secular func­
tions will free resources for "sectarian ends," the Court "never has held that religious activi­
ties must be discriminated against" by denying secular aid.); see also Tilton, 403 U.S. at 679 
(plurality opinion) ("[B]us transportation, textbooks, and tax exemptions all gave aid in the 
sense that religious bodies would otherwise have been forced to find other sources from 
which to finance these services. Yet all of these forms of government assistance have been 
upheld." (citing, inter alia, Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968))). 
263. 413 U.S. 734, 745 n.7 (1973). 
264. Walz, 397 U.S. at 674. 
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sarily violate the Establishment Clause. As the Court stated in 
Agostini, "Interaction between church and state is inevitable, and we 
have always tolerated some level of involvement between the two. "265 
Rather, the church-state entanglement must be excessive in order to 
violate the Establishment Clause.266 The Court has placed great em­
phasis on the frequency and extent of contact between the govern­
ment and the religious authority behind a school or institution of 
higher education in determining whether administrative entanglement 
is excessive. In Lemon, the Court found excessive entanglement where 
the possibility for diversion of government aid to religious indoctrina­
tion necessitated a "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing 
state surveillance."267 Although the Court has subsequently rejected 
the presumption that prompted the need for continuing surveillance in 
Lemon,268 this development leaves untouched the principle that suffi­
ciently intrusive surveillance is a form of excessive entanglement. 
Thus, the Court has approved of aid distributed in the form of a "one­
time, single-purpose" grant269 and aid distributed annually with only 
" 'quick and non-judgmental' " audits of a sectarian university's use of 
government aid.270 
The general extent of a state or municipality's entanglement with 
the religious authorities behind a pervasively sectarian institution is 
extremely limited, as the following description of a typical conduit is­
suance shows.271 The initial act in transactions such as those detailed in 
Lynn and Steele is the legislative creation of an agency (an "author­
ity") authorized to issue revenue bonds.272 The borrowing party (the 
"entity") then approaches the authority with a proposed project 
265. 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997) (internal citation omitted). 
266. Id. 
267. 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971); see also id. at 622 (finding excessive entanglement where 
the government's inspection of a religiously oriented school's financial records would foster 
"an intimate and continuing relationship between church and state"). 
268. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234. 
269. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 688. 
270. Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 764 (plurality opinion) (quoting 
Roemer v. Bd. Of Pub. Works, 387 F. Supp. 1282, 1296 (D. Md. 1974)). 
271 .  The following passage describes the most conupon elements of a revenue bond is­
suance as reflected in case law and certain secondary sources. It is possible that a given issu­
ance will vary to some degree. 
272. See, e.g., Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 736-39 (1973)) (describing the issuance of 
revenue bonds by South Carolina's Educational Facilities Authority pursuant to S.C. CODE 
ANN. 22-41 .4 (currently codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-101-10 to -109-180 (Law Co-op. 
1990) & Supp. 2001))); Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 1 17 F. Supp. 2d 693, 700-01 (M.D. Tenn. 
2000) (discussing the issuance of revenue bonds by a Tennessee industrial development 
board pursuant to TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-53-lOl(ll)(A)(vii) (Supp. 1990); Va. Coll. Bldg. 
Auth. v. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d 682, 687 (Va. 2000) (discussing the issuance of revenue bonds by 
Virginia's Educational Facilities Authority pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 23-30.42 (Michie 
2000)). 
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seeking a revenue bond-funded loan to finance it.273 The authority ap­
proves the revenue bond issuance, sometimes after a public hearing274 
or with independent approval of the issuance from a third party.275 A 
trustee is responsible for supervising the entity's adherence to the loan 
agreement, receiving payments from the entity, and representing the 
interests of bondholders.276 An underwriter purchases unsold bonds 
from the authority and subsequently resells them on the bond market 
to individual purchasers.277 
The authority is not required to monitor the entity's compliance 
with the terms of the loan agreement and, moreover, is not obligated 
to ensure that the entity does not use secular aid for sectarian pur­
poses. Likewise, the authority plays no role in redistributing payments 
from the private entity to bondholders. The government's involvement 
therefore amounts to little more than the initial creation of the issuing 
authority and the subsequent approval of the transaction.278 This in­
volvement is far closer to that approved in Tilton than to the continu­
ing surveillance rejected in Lemon.219 
In assessing the degree of political entanglement, the essential 
question is whether the aid under consideration would lead to "politi­
cal division along religious lines."280 With revenue bond issuances such 
as those under consideration here, the Court is unlikely to reach such 
a finding. Colleges and universities have traditionally been subject to 
greater leniency in the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause juris-
273. See Hunt, 413 U.S. at 738 (describing the proposal submitted by Baptist College at 
Charleston to South Carolina's Educational Facilities Authority); Steele, 1 17 F. Supp. 2d at 
694 (noting that Lipscomb University asked the industrial development board for a "$15 
million, low-interest loan"); Lynn, 538 S.E.2d at 688 (describing Regent University's applica­
tion to the Educational Facilities Authority). 
274. See, e.g. , Steele, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 693 (noting that the industrial development 
board held two public hearings prior to approving Lipscomb University's proposal). 
275. See, e.g. , id. at 702-03 (describing the mayor's role in certifying that the proposed 
bond issuance would be exempt from federal taxation). 
276. ROBERT LAMB, ET AL. THE HANDBOOK OF MUNICIPAL BONDS AND PUBLIC 
FINANCE 868 (1993) (defining "trustee"). 
277. See id. at 24. 
278. The issuance in Hunt varied slightly from the transaction discussed in this Section. 
In Hunt, "the College would convey the project to . . .  the Authority, which would lease the 
property so conveyed to the College. After payment in full of the bonds, the project would 
be reconveyed to the College." Hunt, 413 U.S. at 738. Neither the Lynn nor Steele transac­
tions included this kind of conveyance. 
279. See MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE LAW, supra note 16, § 3.4.3 (applying the "exces­
sive entanglement" inquiry and concluding - even without considering the role of a trustee 
in supervising the beneficiary university in lieu of the conduit issuer - that the government's 
role "seems to entangle church and state no more than the planning that precedes direct 
grants of government funds to sectarian institutions, where the Supreme Court has approved 
the relationship"( citing Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976))). 
280. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971). 
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prudence than primary or secondary schools.281 In addition, the Court 
noted in Roemer the fact that "more than two-thirds" of private col­
leges have no religious affiliation, apparently reasoning that when the 
government extends aid to all private colleges, such aid will not give 
the impression that the government is promoting religious education 
in particular. 282 
In the case of revenue bond issuances, moreover, a rule excluding 
consideration of an applicant's religious orientation is less likely to 
lead to "political division along religious lines"283 than a rule author­
izing the government to inquire into an applicant's religious affiliation. 
If a conduit issuer must bar institutions such as Lipscomb and Regent 
from participating in revenue bond financing, that authority would 
have to inquire into each applicant's religious affiliation, gauging the 
degree to which religion permeates a university's curriculum and as­
sessing the likelihood that secular aid would be diverted to religious 
purposes.284 Moreover, the Authority may have to conduct this inquiry 
in the context of a public hearing, a possibility that could produce the 
"political division along religious lines" that the Court envisioned with 
trepidation in Lemon.285 Even if state authorities were able to conduct 
such inquiry without bias, it is inevitable that rejection of an institu­
tion's proposal based on its religious affiliation would lead to litiga­
tion, as this determination would rest on a subjective characterization 
of the extent to which religion pervades an applicant's curriculum. In 
contrast, if state authorities issued revenue bonds without regard to a 
beneficiary's religious orientation, political division would be less 
likely because any applicant could make a proposal to an issuing 
authority without having to justify its religious - or secular - orien­
tation. Once the Court recognizes the participation of pervasively sec­
tarian institutions in such financing arrangements as in accord with the 
First Amendment, any litigation arising from an authority's approval 
of a revenue bond issuance is unlikely to center on the applicant's re­
ligious persuasion. 
281. See, e.g. , Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 687-88 (1971) (plurality opinion) (rea­
soning that the "potential for divisive religious fragmentation" at a college or university is 
mitigated by the fact that a college or university is likely to have a diverse student body); see 
also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, § 12.2.6.3 (describing the Court's "more lenient" stance 
toward aid that benefits colleges and universities). 
282. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 765-66 (plurality opinion). 
283. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622. 
284. See Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 1 17 F. Supp. 2d 693, 701 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (stating 
that, before approving a bond issuance, the industrial development board must determine 
that the bonds will advance a "legitimate public purpose" - a finding that would be impos­
sible if the issuance violated the Establishment Clause). 
285. 403 U.S. at 622. 
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B. The Conduit Issuer's Approval Under the Endorsement Analysis 
This Section shows that, besides satisfying the Lemon/Agostini ef­
fect analysis, revenue bond issuances benefiting pervasively sectarian 
institutions also comply with the endorsement test.286 Although the 
Court has long considered whether a government action endorses re­
ligion, Justice O'Connor articulated a "sound analytical framework"287 
for an endorsement test in Lynch v. Donnelly,288 which the Court 
adopted in 1989 in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties 
Union.289 The underlying logic of the endorsement test is that the Es­
tablishment Clause prohibits the government from "appearing to take 
a position on questions of religious belief or from 'making adherence 
to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political 
community. '  "290 When applying this test, the Court considers whether 
a particular government act has endorsed, favored, or promoted re­
ligion in general or a specific religious orientation.291 The Court views 
the government act under inquiry from the perspective of a "reason­
able observer,"292 asking whether the government has "discriminate[d] 
in favor of private religious . . .  activity."293 
While the Court has typically applied the endorsement test in the 
context of the placement of a physical display such as a creche on gov­
ernment property,294 it is possible to apply the test to a less tangible act 
such as the authorization df a revenue bond issuance.295 This analysis 
presents certain challenges in this more abstract context. As articu­
lated in Lynch and Allegheny, the endorsement analysis requires that 
a court consider the symbol constituting the would-be endorsement in 
286. See, e.g. , Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989) (de­
scribing the "endorsement" test). 
287. Id. at 595 (opinion of Blackmun, J.). 
288. 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, did not vio-
late the Establishment Clause by including a creche in its Christmas display). 
289. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
290. Id. at 594 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). 
291. Id. at 592-94; see also Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 
753, 763 (1995) (plurality opinion) ("Our cases have accordingly equated 'endorsement' with 
'promotion' or 'favoritism.' "). 
· 
292. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620 (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 
474 U.S. 481, 493 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (in­
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
293. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 764 (plurality opinion). 
294. See, e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (creche and menorah); Lynch, 465 U.S. 668 
(creche). 
295. Indeed, the District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee noted in Steele that 
the Sixth Circuit has substituted the endorsement analysis for the "effects" prong of the 
Lemon test. Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 1 17 F. Supp. 2d 693, 731 (M.D. Tenn. 2000). 
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context - its "physical setting" and "unique circumstances."296 In 
Steele, the District Court for the Middle District Of Tennessee applied 
this test by focusing on the Official Statement released pursuant to the 
issuance of revenue bonds.297 The court noted that the Official State­
ment "places the government's role first and then describes the uni­
versity, the project, and the uses of the funds provided through the 
bond proceeds,'' adding that the description of the university goes into 
the school's religious orientation in depth.298 Based on this review of 
the Official Statement, the court concluded that "[t]he structure and 
content of the Official Statement indicates to the reasonable observer 
that the Board . . .  is endorsing the sectarian beliefs and teachings of 
Lipscomb University."299 
Because the standard in Lynch and Allegheny requires that the 
court place the offending act or object in its context and that the court 
view the would-be endorsement in its actual setting,300 Steele's en­
dorsement inquiry is inadequate for two reasons. First, an Official 
Statement's context is a proposed municipal bond issuance. Thus, this 
document has a particular reasonable observer as its intended audi­
ence: a prospective bond purchaser engaged in making an investment 
decision. Just as a reasonable observer in an art museum appreciates a 
religious work of art as art,301 a reasonable observer of an Official 
Statement must view this document as a solicitation for a financial 
transaction rather than a statement of the government's position con­
cerning religion. Second, the endorsement analysis should take into 
account that the Official Statement is one of a multitude of such 
documents released by the development authority. This conclusion 
follows from Justice O'Connor's art museum illustration in Lynch.302 
Because a museum includes a variety of paintings of secular and re-
296. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595 (plurality opinion) (quoting Lynch (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); see also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
297. 117 F. Supp. 2d at 733-34. 
298. Id. at 733 (noting that the Official Statement provides: "As stated in its 1990-91 
school catalog, the supreme purpose of the University is 'to teach the Bible as the revealed 
will of God to man and as the only and sufficient rule of faith and practice, and to train those 
who attend in a pure Bible Christianity' "). 
299. Id. at 734. The court suggests, however, that it might have reached a different out­
come had the Official Statement included a disclaimer. Id. 
300. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595 (Blackmun, J.); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, 
J., concurring). 
· 
301. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Although the religious and 
indeed sectarian significance of the creche, as the District Court found, is not neutralized by 
the setting, the overall holiday setting changes what viewers may fairly understand to be the 
purpose of the display - as a typical museum setting, though not neutralizing the religious 
content of a religious painting, negates any message of endorsement of that content. The 
display celebrates a public holiday, and no one contends that declaration of that holiday is 
understood to be an endorsement of religion."). 
302. Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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ligious content, a single religious painting does not convey a message 
of endorsement.303 A court applying the reasonable observer test to an 
official statement, therefore, must consider that document in its ,par­
ticular setting.304 A reasonable observer would have no reason to view 
any single official statement as a government endorsement of the re­
cipient university's religious orientation because the observer would 
be aware of issuances benefiting other universities with alternative re­
ligious and secular orientations. 
An official statement is part of a complex financial transaction and, 
as such, a court applying the reasonable observer analysis must look 
beyond the pages of the official statement to the statutory authoriza­
tion for the transaction and the ensuing relationships between issuer, 
beneficiary, and trustee.305 In this context, a reasonable observer may 
view the bond issuance benefiting a pervasively sectarian university in 
the context of the legislature's desire to promote higher education,306 
the neutral availability of revenue bond financing,307 and the govern­
ment's de minimis involvement in any given transaction.308 That this 
government aid is available and, in fact, utilized by institutions repre­
senting a wide variety of religious viewpoints should suggest to a rea­
sonable observer that the government does not endorse or favor the 
religion of any single participant. From this perspective, religion is 
wholly irrelevant. 
In the final analysis, the endorsement analysis is satisfied only if an 
authority empowered to issue revenue bonds does not take an appli­
cant's religious orientation into account in determining whether to 
authorize a bond issuance. In concluding, as the district court did in 
Steele, that the authority must exclude certain applicants because of 
their religious beliefs and the extent to which these beliefs inform their 
actions in ostensibly secular affairs, the court would require the gov­
ernment to disfavor certain religious persuasions. This result makes an 
303. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
304. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595 (Blackmun, J.). 
305. Whether or not a government action is an endorsement "depends upon the mes­
sage that the government's practice communicates: the question is 'what viewers may fairly 
understand to be the purpose of the display.' " Id. (Blackmun, J.) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. 
at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). The purpose of an official statement for a proposed 
revenue bond issuance depends upon the statutory authorization for the issuance and the 
nature of the ensuing transaction. 
306. See Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 1 17 F. Supp. 2d 693, 700 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (quoting 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-53-lOl(ll)(A)(vii) (2000 Supp.)) (stating that the board issuing reve­
nue bonds to Lipscomb University as powered "to approve tax-exempt bonds for various 
public works and projects, including 'any nonprofit educational institution in any manner 
related to or in furtherance of the educational purposes of such institution' " (alteration in 
original)). 
307. See, e.g. , id. 
308. See supra Section III. A. 
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applicant's religious affiliation relevant to its "standing in the political 
community," a practice the Supreme Court has recognized as plainly 
contrary to the basic mandate of the Establishment Clause.309 
CONCLUSION 
Constitutional scholar Erwin Chemerinsky has protested what he 
identifies as the Supreme Court's recent tendency to place near exclu­
sive emphasis on neutrality in the distribution of government aid, ar­
guing that such a standard violates the "values of the Establishment 
Clause": 
First, freedom of conscience would be offended because people would be 
forced to support and subsidize religions that they do not believe in, even 
if all religions are treated equally. Second, treating all religions equally 
does not address the need to make all feel comfortable with their gov­
ernment. Those who disavow any religious belief would be forced to 
support all religions; indeed, they would be surrounded with parochial 
schools supported by their tax dollars . . . .  Third, [neutrality does not] 
protect religions from the intrusion of government involvement. Justice 
Thomas' equality theory would mean that the government would be en­
meshed in almost every aspect of religious schools and religious institu­
tions. The government, as a condition for funding, could ____:_ and should 
- set curricula and educational requirements. The government would 
need to monitor to see if these mandates were met. This is a threat to re­
ligion and it is no Jess so because all religions are threatened equally.310 
This Note has shown that not a single one of the legitimate dangers 
identified here by Professor Chemerinsky - neither compulsory sub­
sidization, nor endorsement, nor the intrusion of government into sec­
tarian activities - is present when pervasively sectarian institutions 
participate in conduit financing. The unique qualities of a revenue 
bond issuance - its neutral allocation of government aid, minimal 
contact between church and state, and absolute exclusion of public 
funds from aid to religious universities - obviate any genuine Estab­
lishment Clause concerns. Conduit financing, therefore, presents a 
special case of government aid to religious institutions that remains 
faithful to the "wall of separation"311 between church and state. 
309. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593-94 (Blackmun, J.) ("Whether the key word is 'en­
dorsement,' 'favoritism,' or 'promotion,' the essential principle remains the same. The Es­
tablishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a posi­
tion on questions of religious belief or from 'making adherence to a religion relevant in any 
way to a person's standing in the political community. ' "  (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 
(O'Connor, J., concurring)). 
310. Chemerinsky, supra note 154, at 232. 
311 .  See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 n.1 (attributing the "wall of separation" metaphor to 
Thomas Jefferson). 
